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YOU CAN'T GET THERE FROM HERE: TRAVEL
RESTRICTIONS AND THE AIRLINES
KATHERINE WARNER
I. INTRODUCTION
TN THE MIDST of social, political, and economic up-
1heaval around the world, governmentally imposed
travel restrictions are rapidly being revised in many coun-
tries.' The removal of international barriers to free travel
will have ramifications on all aspects of travel-related in-
dustries, particularly the aviation industry. Despite this
new attitude toward freedom of travel, the United States
has legitimate concerns over protecting its citizens abroad
and at home, as well as providing for the effective admin-
istration of American foreign policy abroad. These con-
cerns have led to a continued governmental policy of
imposing travel restrictions based on national security
See, e.g., Justin Burke, Soviets Ease Foreign Travel, GANNETr NEWS SERVICE, May
21, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wire Services File (foreign travel pass-
ports to be available to most Soviet citizens); Paul Proctor, Taiwan's Air Traffic
Surging, Avi. WK. & SPACE TECH., Jan. 21, 1991, at 40, 47 (1991) (governmental
travel restrictions eased in Taiwan); Serge Schmemann, Clamor in the East Challenge
for Dissidents, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 1989, at A12 (East Germany announces un-
restricted travel to the West in wake of opening of Berlin Wall); Graham Earn-
shaw, Burns Case May Harm China's "Open Door" Image, REUTERS, July 20, 1986,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wire Services File (progressive relaxation of re-
strictions to travel into China in recent years); Bradley Graham, U.S. Allies Fear
They Will Stay: Polish Tourists Turned Away, WASH. POST, July 11, 1984, at AI (Po-
land's easing of restrictions to travel floods U.S. Embassy with Polish applicants
for tourist visas); Paul Betts, Lower Fuel Costs and Cutbacks Enable Air France Turn-
around, FIN. TIMEs,Jan. 12, 1984, § 2, at 17 (French travel restrictions imposed as
part of austerity program relaxed by government).
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and foreign policy grounds.2
There exists under the United States Constitution a
right to travel,3 which the government may limit only for
certain overriding concerns.4 When a United States citi-
zen's right to travel is limited by denial or revocation of
his passport, he loses the ability to engage in international
travel since he will be prevented from entering and exit-
ing the country.5 The airlines, while not possessing the
government's ability to preclude all travel, do have the ca-
pability of seriously curtailing access to their services. 6
Although alternative means of transportation may exist
for a traveler denied permission to board or expelled
from a flight, denial of transportation aboard an airline
can cause inconvenience at the least and at worst expo-
sure to danger from being stranded in a foreign or hostile
territory.
As common carriers, airlines have a duty to provide
transportation to all persons who tender the appropriate
fare.7 Airlines are also required to safeguard all their pas-
sengers. 8 The airlines' status as common carriers is rarely
discussed today by courts and legislatures, except when
an issue arises involving the airlines' ability to deny access
to potential passengers. The focus in recent years has
shifted instead to interpreting federal regulations and
rules that may allow an airline to discriminate on security
grounds. The airlines' concerns over the safety of the
flight and its passengers are legitimate, like the federal
government's concern over national security. Unlike the
government, 9 the airlines' discretion is virtually without a
- See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 306 (1981); Abourzek v. Reagan 785 F.2d
1043, 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Wald v. Regan, 708 F.2d 794, 797 (2d Cir. 1983).
Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129 (1958).
See discussion infra part II.
5 Agee, 453 U.S. at 300; Zemel v. Risk, 381 U.S. 1, 7 (1965); Kent, 357 U.S. at
121.
i See discussion infra part III.
Austin v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 246 So.2d 894, 896 (La. Ct. App. 1971).
Id. at 896-97.
11 See discussion infra parts ILA, II.B.
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system of checks and balances.' 0
Differences exist between the instance when a person is
denied access to a flight and one in which a person's pass-
port is revoked. The most obvious difference is the scope
of the restriction from travel: an airline passenger remains
free to obtain other transportation to carry him to the de-
sired destination, if it is available, while a person who has
been denied a passport faces criminal charges if he at-
tempts to leave the country." Another difference is the
disparity in the amount of time in which the determina-
tion must be made. A decision to reject a passport appli-
cation or revoke a currently valid passport may stretch
over a period of months and allows for careful investiga-
tion and administrative review.' 2 When a carrier denies
boarding or removes a passenger from a flight, it must
often make its decision within minutes without in-depth
inquiry into the true degree of danger the passenger
poses to the safety of the flight.' 3 A third difference is
that the government may bring experienced intelligence
personnel into its investigation, 14 while the airline's deci-
sion is usually made by pilots and check-in counter clerks
who are not trained in making such determinations.' 5 Fi-
nally, when a person is denied the right to travel by the
government, he or she has the right to an administrative
hearing on the revocation of his passport, while a passen-
See discussion infra part III.
'I A five year prison sentence or five thousand dollar fine may be imposed for
entering or exiting the country without a valid passport. 8 U.S.C. § 1185 (1988).
12 See, e.g., Agee, 453 U.S. at 289 (revocation determination and investigation
stretched over a period of four months); Kent, 357 U.S. at 119 (1958) (three
month period of investigation); Briehl v. Dulles, 248 F.2d 561, 567 (D.C. Cir.
1957), rev'd, 357 U.S. 116 (1958) (two month deliberation period).
1:1 Williams v. Trans World Airlines, 509 F.2d 942, 948 (2d Cir. 1974)(noting
the time limitation on the airline in making the decision of whether or not to allow
a passenger to board).
11 See, e.g., Agee, 453 U.S. at 286 (CIA intelligence personnel supplied the State
Department with information regarding applicant's activities and political affilia-
tions); Apthekar v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 515 (1964) (intelligence agen-
cies notified the Secretary of State of applicants' membership in Communist
Party).
15 22 C.F.R. §§ 51.80-.89 (1991).
1992] 347
348 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [58
ger denied access to a flight by an airline may have no
such opportunity. In fact, the airline may not even ques-
tion the passenger prior to making its decision, but
merely inform him after the fact. The passenger is left
with no opportunity to challenge the determination until
long after the flight has left.' 6
Given the importance of free access to travel in our so-
ciety and the heavy regulation of the aviation industry,
one would expect stringent limits on the airlines' discre-
tion in refusing to carry a passenger. Careful scrutiny and
strict enforcement of such standards would also be ex-
pected. Surprisingly, however, the guidelines for refusal
of carriage have been promulgated piecemeal over the
years and in some areas standards simply require the air-
line to follow whatever policy it sets for itself.' 7 The real-
ity of modern life is such that air travel is often the only
viable means of travel, and an inability to board an airline
or expulsion in the middle of a journey may strand a pas-
senger in unknown territory with little money and limited
means of extricating himself from the situation. Balanced
against this scenario is the airlines' very real need to safe-
guard the flight for the other passengers, and the under-
standable fear of liability for injury to those passengers.
Without clear and comprehensive guidelines to aid airline
personnel in the time pressured determination of whether
to refuse a passenger the right to board, the constitutional
right to travel may have little meaning.
This comment first examines the limitations on the gov-
ernment in restricting the right to travel nationally and
internationally. The discussion then turns to the limita-
tions and liabilities of the airlines in restricting access to
their services. The success of the legislative attempts to
achieve a balance between the concern for safety and pre-
vention of discrimination is examined. Statutory and case
law regarding overbooking, racial and disability discrimi-
" Zervigon v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 558 F. Supp. 1305, 1307 (S.D.N.Y.
1983).
7 See discussion infra part III.
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nation, intoxication or unruly behavior by a passenger,
and the threat or actuality of terrorism are surveyed. Fi-
nally, this comment explores the effectiveness of current
regulations in promoting passenger safety and providing
guidelines to the airlines regarding denial of access.
II. GOVERNMENTAL RESTRICTIONS ON TRAVEL
A. INTERSTATE RIGHT TO TRAVEL
The existence of the right to travel as one of the liber-
ties guaranteed by the Constitution has often been dis-
cussed in the context of interstate travel.' 8 As stated in
United States v. Guest, "[t]he constitutional right to travel
from one state to another.., occupies a position funda-
mental to the concept of our Federal Union . . . [A] right
so elementary was conceived from the beginning to be a
necessary concomitant of the stronger Union the Consti-
tution created."' 9 The constitutional basis for the right to
travel has not always been clearly delineated by the
courts, but generally has been attributed to the Privileges
and Immunities Clause of Article IV.2 0 In some cases, the
Commerce Clause has also been used as the basis for
striking down a state law limiting interstate travel.'
In Crandall v. Nevada 22 the Supreme Court confronted
the issue of whether a state could place a direct barrier on
interstate travel. At issue was Nevada's imposition of a
tax on persons leaving the state by paid transportation.
The Court, reluctant to equate people with articles of
" See Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 67 (1982) (Brennan,J., concurring); Sha-
piro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630-31 (1969); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S.
745, 757-58 (1966).
11, Guest, 383 U.S. at 757-58.
211 See Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 169, 178 (1941) (Douglas,J., concurring);
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 44 (1873); Crandall v. Nevada, 73
U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 38 (1868); Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 552 (C.C.E.D. Pa.
1823) (No. 3230).
21 See, e.g., Edwards, 314 U.S. at 174 (California statute prohibiting entry into
state by indigent people was held an impermissible burden on interstate
commerce).
"2 Crandall, 73 U.S. at 35.
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commerce, 23 declined to rely on the constitutional prohi-
bition against taxation of imports and exports by states24
or on the Commerce Clause.2 5 The Court instead found
an inherent right to travel in the broad nature of the Fed-
eral Union, stating that "we are all citizens of the United
States, and as members of the same community we must
have the right to pass and repass through every part of it
without interruption. 26
In 1941 the Court again faced the right to travel ques-
tion in Edwards v. California.27 This case concerned a Cali-
fornia law prohibiting indigent people from travelling
into the state. The law was enacted during the Great De-
pression to combat the vast migration into California
from the dustbowls of the central states. A five justice ma-
jority utilized the Commerce Clause to strike down the
law, finding that its "burden upon interstate commerce is
intended and immediate."2 8 The four concurring justices,
however, noted that the Fourteenth Amendment pro-
tected the right to travel as an inherent privilege or immu-
nity of national citizenship. 29
In more recent cases involving the interstate right to
travel, the Court has continued to maintain that there ex-
ists a fundamental right to interstate movement." In Sha-
2: Id. at 41.
21 Id. at 36. The Constitution forbids states from "lay[ing] any Imposts or Du-
ties on Imports or Exports." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2.
25 Crandall, 73 U.S. at 41.
26 Id. at 49 (quoting the Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 492 (1849)
(Taney, J., dissenting)).
2, 314 U.S. at 160.
2 Id. at 174.
29 Id. at 178 (Douglas, J., joined by Black and Murphy, J.J., concurring), 181
(Jackson, J., concurring).
" See Attorney General of N.Y. v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 906 (1986) (deny-
ing state's ability to enact legislation based on duration of residency); Hooper v.
Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612, 621 (1985) (prohibiting restriction of
interstate movement); Zobel, 457 U.S. at 65 (1982) (prohibiting preferential treat-
ment to state residents as violation of right to travel); Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa
County, 415 U.S. 250, 258 (1974) (invalidating state parochial legislation); Dunn
v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 337 (1972) (noting the historical basis of the right to
travel); Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 638 (1969) (upholding right to interstate travel); cf
TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS
piro v. Thompson, 3 ' the Court first announced the
"compelling state interest" test, requiring that a state law
creating two classes of state residents based on the dura-
tion of their residency must be closely tied to a compel-
ling state interest to survive the strict scrutiny to which
courts would subject such a law.3 2 This test has been ap-
plied by the Court in subsequent decisions striking down
state laws imposing a minimum duration of residency or a
specific date for taking up residency as a condition of vot-
ing,33 county funded non-emergency hospitalization or
medical care, 4 distribution of surplus oil revenues, 5 tax
exemptions to Vietnam veterans,3 6 and preference in civil
service employment for veterans.3 7 The Court went so far
in one of these cases as to state that any classification pe-
nalizing travel triggered the compelling state interest
test.3
8
Another Privileges and Immunities Clause test tradi-
tionally employed by the Court under the clause's juris-
prudence is the "peculiar evil" test, originating from
Toomer v. Witsell.3 9 This test states that where some impor-
tant state interest exists (the "evil" that must be amelio-
rated), a state statute relegating certain persons to a
discriminated-against class (the "peculiar" source of the
"evil") would be upheld if there is a sufficiently close rela-
tionship between the means proferred and the ends
obtained.40
Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 395-96 (1975) (allowing restriction of interstate
movement).
.1 394 U.S. at 618.
:12 Id. at 638.
.1 Dunn, 405 U.S. at 335.
.4 Maricopa, 415 U.S. at 255.
-- Zobel, 457 U.S. at 65.
:. Hooper, 472 U.S. at 619-23.
:17 Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. at 899-912.
3s Varicopa, 415 U.S. at 258.
-1 334 U.S. 385, 396-98 (1948); see also United Bldg. & Constr. Trades v. Mayor,
465 U.S. 208, 222 (1984); Zobel, 457 U.S. at 76 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring);
Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 525-26 (1978) (each utilizing the "peculiar evil"
test).
40 Toomer, 334 U.S. at 396-98. Another test given in this case was that the Privi-
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In Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper4 the Court
further refined the test.
The Clause does not preclude discrimination against non-
residents where (i) there is a substantial reason for the dif-
ference in treatment; and (ii) the discrimination practiced
against nonresidents bears a substantial relationship to the
state's objective. In deciding whether the discrimination
bears a close or substantial relationship to the State's ob-
jective, the Court has considered the availability of less re-
strictive means.42
Regardless of which test is used, it seems clear from the
foregoing that the interstate right to travel will be care-
fully protected, and intrusions into this right will be care-
fully scrutinized by the courts.
B. INTERNATIONAL RIGHT TO TRAVEL
1. History
In early English history the King had the right to pre-
vent travel by his subjects and to recall them from
abroad. 3 In the United States, the right of citizens to
travel among the states has long been recognized." The
right to travel to foreign countries, however, has never
been as clearly or unqualifiedly stated.
Governmental sanction of travel outside the United
States in the form of a valid passport has long been re-
quired for United States citizens. From the earliest cases,
leges and Immunities clause would not invalidate "disparity of treatment" if there
existed independently valid reasons in close relation to the degree of discrimina-
tion. Id. at 396. This second test has been increasingly used in favor of the "pe-
culiar evil" test in more recent decisions and bears a marked resemblance to the
compelling state interest test adopted in the Shapiro line of cases. See Shapiro, 394
U.S. at 638.
-1 470 U.S. 274 (1985).
42 Id. at 284.
13 Briehl v. Dulles, 248 F.2d 561, 568-69 (D.C. Cir. 1957), rev'd, 357 U.S. 116
(1958); 1 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 230 (6th ed. 1938).
" ARTS. OF CONFEDERATION art. IV; U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2. See Hess v. Pawl-
oski, 274 U.S. 352, 355 (1927); Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 274 (1900); Breihl,
248 F.2d at 569. See also discussion of state's ability to place limitations on inter-
state travel, supra part III.
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passports were recognized as "document(s) identifying a
citizen, in effect requesting foreign powers to allow the
bearer to enter and to pass freely and safely, recognizing
the right of the bearer to the protection and good offices
of American diplomatic and consular officers." 45  For
much of this country's history a passport was not neces-
sary for entrance into or departure from the United
States.46 Prompted by the War of 1812, the first "travel-
control" statute was passed in 1815 prohibiting citizens
from "cross[ing] the frontier into . . . enemy [territory]
without a passport. '4 7 Until that time, passports had only
been used to extend protection to United States citizens
travelling abroad.48 Effectively the same restrictions were
again imposed during the Civil War.4 9
Prior to 1856, the issuance of passports was not regu-
lated, and the confusion resulting from unregulated and
conflicting passport authentication led some foreign
countries to decline to acknowledge United States pass-
ports.5" The Act of 1856 (the "Passport Act") 5' at-
tempted to resolve this confusion by providing that:
the Secretary of State shall be authorized to grant and is-
sue passports, and cause passports to be granted, issued,
and verified in foreign countries by diplomatic or consular
officers of the United States, and under rules as the Presi-
dent shall designate and prescribe for and on behalf of the
United States, and no other person shall grant, issue, or
verify any such passport. 52
The Passport Act made it a crime for a person to issue a
passport unless authorized to do so. 53 It was re-enacted
45 United States v. Laub, 385 U.S. 475,481 (1967). See also Urtetiqui v. D'Arbel,
34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 692, 699 (1835); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 120-21 (1958); 3
HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 435 (1942).
- 3 MOORE, INTERNATIONAL LAW DIGEST 862 (1906).
47 3 Stat. 199 (1815); Kent, 357 U.S. at 131 (Clark, J., dissenting).
4s Kent, 357 U.S. at 131.
49 Id. at 132.
MOORE, supra note 46, at 862-63.
11 Stat. 60 (1856) (codified as amended 15 U.S.C. § 188 (1988)).
Id.
' ld. at 60-61.
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in 1926 in virtually identical form and remained in effect
until 1978. 54 Passports were not required for travel
outside of the United States until the enactment of new
travel-control statutes during the First and Second World
Wars, 5 when Congress passed the forerunners to section
215 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952.56
These statutes provided that a presidential proclamation
of war or national emergency made it unlawful to enter or
leave the United States without a valid passport.
Although entrance to and exit from the United States
were restricted by proclamation of war or national emer-
gency, once a United States citizen had left the United
States with a valid passport there was no control over his
movement through foreign countries under the travel-
control statutes. Concerns for the safety of American citi-
zens, for the reputation and national security of the coun-
try as a whole, and for the involvement of the United
States government in international incidents led to the
promulgation of area restrictions by the Secretary of
State.5 7  These restrictions were usually imposed by
means of refusal to issue a passport for a specific area or a
stamp placed on the passport stating that it was "not valid
for use in" the interdicted country. 58  Prior to the enact-
ment of the first Passport Act in 191859 the President had
"4 44 Stat. 887 (1926). In 1874 the words "shall be authorized to" were re-
placed by "may." Rev. Stat. § 4075 (1874). This revision led to later disputes
over the scope of the Secretary's discretionary power to refuse or renew pass-
ports. See discussion infra at notes 73-79, 104-11 and accompanying text.
55 Act of May 22, 1918, 40 Stat. 559; Act ofJune 21, 1941, 55 Stat. 252.
.16 Act ofJune 27, 1952, 66 Stat. 190. The Immigration and Nationality Act is a
criminal statute providing for the imposition of a five year prison sentence or a
five thousand dollar fine. 8 U.S.C. § 1185 (1988). Seealso Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S.
1, 22 (1965); Laub, 385 U.S. at 477.
57 See, e.g., Zemel, 381 U.S. at 14-16. The President is required by statute to gain
the release of United States citizens held unjustly by a foreign government by the
"use [of] such means, not amounting to acts of war, as he may think necessary and
proper." 22 U.S.C. § 1732 (1988 and Supp. 1991). This requirement was noted
in Zemel as one of the main concerns of allowing unrestricted movement of United
States citizens in foreign countries. Zemel, 381 U.S. at 15.
58 Zemel, 381 U.S. at 9-11.
5!1 Act of May 22, 1918, 40 Stat. 559 (1918), repealed by Act ofJune 27, 1952, 66
Stat. 279, 280 (1952).
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twice imposed area restrictions in both peacetime and
wartime.6" Subsequently, area restrictions were declared
from time to time by the State Department without con-
gressional or judicial challenge as wars broke out and alli-
ances changed.6 '
2. Case Law
Two intersecting lines of cases challenge restrictions on
travel: those contesting restrictions on who may travel 62
and those contesting restrictions on where one may
travel. 63 The first line of cases began in 1957, when the
District of Columbia Circuit Court in Kent v. Dulles upheld
a State Department regulation prohibiting the issuance of
a passport to a member of the Communist Party or a sup-
porter of the Communist movement. 64  The regulation
was promulgated after the enactment of the Immigration
and Nationality Act of 1952,65 section 215 of which was
operative under President Truman's declaration of na-
tional emergency during the Korean conflict.66 The Kent
case came to the Supreme Court consolidated with the
case of Dr. Walter Briehl, who had been denied a passport
under the same regulations. The Director of the Passport
1*1 Passports for travel to Belgium were issued in 1915 only to those authorized
by the Belgian Relief Commission or Red Cross, or to those "obliged to go thither
by special exigency," due to famine in that country. Zemel, 381 U.S. at 8; 3 HACK-
WORTH, supra note 45, at 526. In 1914 the validation of passports was limited to
specific purposes. An absolute restriction on issuing passports for travel in Ger-
many and Austria continued until 1922 and until 1923 for the Soviet Union.
Zemel, 381 U.S. at 8.
6 Zemel, 381 U.S. at 9-10.
62 See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378
U.S. 500 (1964); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958); Briehl v. Dulles, 248 F.2d
561 (D.C. Cir. 1957), rev'd, 357 U.S. 116 (1958); Copeland v. Secretary of State,
226 F. Supp. 20 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
, See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 764-65 (1972); Zemel v. Rusk, 381
U.S. at 22 (1965); Flynn v. Rusk, 219 F. Supp. 709, 711-12 (D.D.C. 1963), rev'd,
378 U.S. 500 (1964).
'" Kent v. Dulles, 248 F.2d 600, 605 (D.C. Cir. 1957), rev'd, 357 U.S. 116
(1958); 17 Fed. Reg. 8013 (1952), 22 §§ C.F.R. 51.135-143 (1991). The regula-
tions also provide that an applicant may be required to submit an affidavit as to his
past or present membership in the Communist Party. 22 C.F.R. § 51.142 (1991).
8 U.S.C. § 1185 (1988).
Briehl, 248 F.2d at 570 n.51.
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Office had declined to issue passports to both Kent and
Briehl due to allegations that they were Communists and
their refusal to submit affidavits stating whether or not
they were past or present members of the Communist
Party. The Director further notified both that the affida-
vits would be necessary prior to the issuance of a passport
whether or not they availed themselves of their right to an
informal hearing.
The Court discussed in detail the history of the Secre-
tary of State's authority to issue passports 67 and the im-
portance of freedom to travel to our national values.68
For the first time the Court clearly stated that the "right
to travel is a part of the 'liberty' of which the citizen can-
not be deprived without due process of law under the
Fifth Amendment. ' 6' The Court delineated two congres-
sionally authorized categories for the refusal of passports:
(i) when questions exist as to the citizenship and alle-
giance of the applicant, and (ii) when questions exist as to
whether the applicant has engaged in illegal conduct.70
The Court therefore declined to find an inherent execu-
tive power or a congressional authorization by implication
for the Secretary to refuse the issuance of passports on
ideological grounds.7' Stating that "the right of exit is a
personal right included within the word 'liberty' as used
in the Fifth Amendment, ' 72 the Court required regula-
tions curtailing that liberty to "be pursuant to the law-
making functions of the Congress .... Where activities or
enjoyment . . . such as travel, are involved, we will con-
strue narrowly all delegated powers that curtail or dilute
them." 73
The Internal Security Act of 195074 was in effect at the
67 Kent, 357 U.S. at 120-25.
I ld. at 125-27.
Id. at 125.
70 id. at 127.
71 Id. at 128-29.
72 Id. at 129.
7: Id.
71 64 Stat. 987, 50 U.S.C. § 781 (1988). This Act was also known as the Subver-
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time of the Kent decision, and would have provided the
type of congressional authorization the Secretary sought,
but its provisions prohibited passport applications only
from members of Communist organizations required to
register under the Act. 75 Although no organizations had
been required to register at the time of the Kent decision,
the requirement was sustained three years later by a 5-4
margin in Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive
Activities Control Board.76
The Court was confronted with the issue of the consti-
tutionality of congressionally mandated restrictions on
travel for political beliefs in Aptheker v. Secretary of State.77
Both appellants in this case held valid passports at the
time section 6 of the Internal Security Act became opera-
tive by the registration of the Communist Party of the
United States. Both were also members of the Commu-
nist Party of the United States. Aptheker was the editor of
Political Affairs and Flynn was the chairman of the Party.
Subsequent to judicial affirmation of the constitutionality
of the Party's required registration under the Act,78 the
Acting Director of the Passport Office notified appellants
of the revocation of their passports and their right to ad-
ministrative review of the decision. Review was sought
and the decision sustained.79 A three-judge court con-
vened to determine the constitutionality of section 6 of
the Act in the appellants consolidated case and granted
summary judgment to the Secretary. 80 The Supreme
Court reversed and remanded,8' holding that section 6
"too broadly and indiscriminately restricts the right to
travel and thereby abridges the liberty guaranteed by the
sive Activities Control Act, see Aptheker, 378 U.S. at 501, and as the McCarran Act,
see Copeland, 226 F. Supp. at 28.
7s 64 Stat. 987, 993, 50 U.S.C. §§ 781, 785 (1988).
71; 367 U.S. 1, 115 (1961).
77 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
78 Communist Party, 367 U.S. at 115.
7) Aptheker, 378 U.S. at 502-03.
' Id. at 504.
s Id. at 517.
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Fifth Amendment. ' s2 A major deficiency of the Act noted
by the Court was the insubstantial relationship between
the activity of appellants (membership in a Communist or-
ganization) and the activity sought to be proscribed by
Congress (the spreading of Communist doctrine by travel
of its adherents).8 ' The Court was also troubled by the
lack of inquiry into "relevant considerations such as the
individual's knowledge, activity, commitment, and pur-
poses in and places for travel. '84 The Court stated that
the provision must be "narrowly drawn" in achieving its
ends85 and that Congress had "less drastic" means avail-
able to safeguard national security, 86 as was its purported
objective in promulgating the Act.87
The Court again considered restrictions on travel in re-
lation to the perceived evils of Communism in the 1965
case of Zemel v. Rusk. 88 Here, however, the focus shifted
to the constitutionality of area restrictions. The case cen-
tered around a 1961 State Department regulation 89 invali-
dating passports for travel to or in Cuba without special
endorsement. Exceptions were to be granted to "persons
whose travel may be regarded as being in the best inter-
ests of the United States, such as newsmen or business-
men with previously established business interests." 90
Zemel held a valid passport and applied to the State De-
partment for validation for travel to Cuba as a tourist to
learn more about the "state of affairs in Cuba and to make
2 Id. at 505.
". Id. at 514.
84 Id.
85 Id.
-6 Id. at 512.
87 64 Stat. 987, 987-89 (1950) (current version at 50 U.S.C. § 781 (1988)). See
also Apthekar, 378 U.S. at 509 n.8. The fear of Communism was at its height dur-
ing this period and was worsened by the Cuban missile crisis in 1962.
381 U.S. 1 (1965).
" Public Notice 179, 26 Fed. Reg. 492 (1961); Press Release No. 24 (Secretary
of State, Jan. 16, 1961). The regulation was issued pursuant to the Presidential
proclamation of national emergency after the breaking of diplomatic and consular
relations with Cuba. Proclamation No. 3005, 67 Stat. c31 (1953).
!", Zemel, 381 U.S. at 3.
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[him] . .. a better informed citizen." 9' The request was
denied on the ground that the purpose of the trip did not
meet the required standards under the regulation.9 2 The
Court, after extensive discussion of the history of the
Passport Act of 192693 and State Department precedent in
imposing area restrictions,9 4 distinguished Kent v. Dulles95
on the ground that the area restriction in Zemel was not
based on an individual's political beliefs or associations,
but on foreign policy grounds affecting all citizens
equally. 96 The Secretary's authority to impose area re-
strictions was found to be implicitly authorized by Con-
gress under the history of executive imposition of area
restrictions97 and by the reenactment of the Passport Act
of 1926 as section 215 of the Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952.98 The Court held that, although the right to
travel is a liberty that cannot be abridged without due
process of law, "the fact that a liberty cannot be inhibited
without due process of law does not mean that it can
under no circumstances be inhibited."
99
The dissenters, Justices Black, Douglas, and Goldberg,
focused on the congressional authorization and First
Amendment claims. Justice Black found an impermissible
delegation of power in the Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952 and its forerunners as regulation of passports
is "a law-making-not an executive, law-enforcing-func-
tion." 10 0 Justice Douglas, joined by Justice Goldberg,
would have held that the First Amendment right to infor-
mation peripherally protects the right to travel to gain
knowledge.10' "Restrictions to the right to travel in times
91 Id.
92 Id.
!,, 44 Stat. 887, 22 U.S.C. § 211a (1988); Zemel, 381 U.S. at 7-9.
:m Zemel, 381 U.S. at 9-11.
95 357 U.S. at 116.
!"; Zemel, 381 U.S. at 13.
97 Id.
8 66 Stat. 190, 8 U.S.C. § 1185 (1988).
Zemel, 381 U.S. at 14.
'" Id. at 20-21 (Black, J., dissenting).
Id. at 23-26 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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of peace should be so particularized that a First Amend-
ment right is not precluded unless some clear counter-
vailing national interest stands in the way of its
assertion."'' 0 2 Justice Goldberg's dissent examined the
importance of freedom to travel and the claims of inher-
ent and statutory authority of the executive to impose
area restrictions.1 0 3 Failing to find congressional authori-
zation for the Secretary's regulations, Goldberg wanted to
limit the Secretary's authority to deny passports in peace-
time to only those regulations which carry out the original
purpose of the Passport Act, the centralization of author-
ity to issue passports to prevent abuses in their
issuance. 10 4
The same area restriction prohibiting travel to Cuba
was again before the Court in 1967. In United States v.
Laub, ' 5 criminal sanctions were sought by the govern-
ment for an alleged conspiracy to recruit and arrange
travel to Cuba by American citizens holding valid pass-
ports which were not authorized for travel to Cuba. This
was the first attempt to impose criminal sanctions under
the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 or its prede-
cessors for travel to a country subject to an area restric-
tion. 0 6 The Court held that the Act only prohibits
entering or leaving the country without a valid passport,
but does not prohibit the violation of area restrictions. 0 7
Emphasizing that the area restrictions in the past related
solely to the State Department's "safe passage" func-
tion, 10 8 and that the State Department itself had never
before taken the position that it had statutory authority to
impose criminal sanctions for violation of area restric-
I112 Id. at 26.
1 Id. at 27-40 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
"1,4 Id. at 32.
... 385 U.S. at 475.
I Id. at 485. Under § 215 of the Act a fine of five thousand dollars or five years
imprisonment may be imposed. 66 Stat. 163, 190 (current version at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1185 (1988)).
1,,7 Laub, 385 U.S. at 478.
l"s Id. at 483.
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tions,'0 9 the Court found that there existed no statutory
authority to impose criminal sanctions for area restriction
violations under the Act." l0
Ancillary to the right to travel cases are cases arising
under section 212 of the Immigration and Nationality
Act. ' This section prohibits admission of aliens to the
United States if they are members of certain listed classes,
one of which is those who advocate, write, or publish "the
economic, international, and governmental doctrines of
world communism or the establishment in the United
States of totalitarian dictatorship."'" 2 Under this provi-
sion, an alien who has been deemed ineligible for admis-
sion may obtain a waiver of inadmissibility at the direction
of the Attorney General.' 1
In Kleindienst v. Mandel,"' the Supreme Court upheld
the exclusion of Ernest Mandel, a Belgian journalist and
self-styled Marxist, based upon the Attorney General's
discretionary power." 5 The Attorney General declined to
grant Mandel a waiver due to his actions on previous visits
to the United States. Mandel had attended more speak-
ing engagements than he had indicated on his visa appli-
cation and appeared at a function where contributions
were solicited for the legal defense fund of French stu-
dents arrested at a political demonstration in France.
Mandel had apparently not been notified on his previous
visits that his admission to the United States was by way of
waiver from the Attorney General's Office, that he was re-
quired to adhere to his stated itinerary, or that he was for-
bidden from attending gatherings at which political
contributions were solicited. The court action was insti-
tuted on behalf of Mandel and six United States citizens
"I Id. at 485-86.
Id. at 487.
8 U.S.C. § 1182 (Supp. 1990).
"1 Id. at § 1182(a)(28)(G)(v).
''- Id. at (d)(4).
,,4 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
''5 Id. at 769.
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who had requested his presence in this country to partici-
pate in academic conferences and discussions.
The Court reviewed the statutory history of the Immi-
gration and Nationality Act in barring certain defined
classes of aliens from entry into the United States and
found a clear expression of congressional intent.' t 6 The
Court stated that "an unadmitted and nonresident alien
... [has] no constitutional right of entry to this country as
a nonimmigrant alien or otherwise.""' 7 The Court fo-
cused on the First Amendment claim of the United States
citizens to exchange information and views with Mandel
as the basis for its decision." 8 Holding that the right to
receive information and ideas is protected under the First
Amendment," 9 the Court nevertheless found that Con-
gress has plenary power to exclude certain classes of
aliens,"o and the Executive Branch, in the person of the
Attorney General, may refuse to waive inadmissibility of
an alien if he has a reason that is facially legitimate and
bona fide.121 If the Attorney General has used his discre-
tion in the negative exercise of power to refuse a waiver
for such a facially legitimate and bona fide reason, the
Court stated that the judiciary would "neither look behind
the exercise of that discretion, nor test it by balancing its
-;' id. at 761. In 1875, convicts and prostitutes were barred from entry. Act of
March 3, 1875, 18 Stat. 477 (1875). The first general immigration statute was
passed in 1882. Act of Aug. 3, 1882, 22 Stat. 214 (1882). That statute was revised
in 1903, and § 2 of the revised Act made anarchists and those advocating or be-
lieving in the violent overthrow of the government inadmissible. Act of Mar. 3,
1903, 32 Stat. 1213 (1903). An expansion of the subversive alien exclusions was
enacted in the Act of Oct. 16, 1918, 40 Stat. 1012 (1918), and an amendment of
this Act was enacted as Title II of the Alien Registration Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 671
(1940). This barred aliens who advocated or were associated with organizations
that advocated the violent overthrow of the United States Government. The In-
ternal Security Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 987 (1950), which was retained in substance
in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1988), required
only membership in the Communist Party as grounds for barring admission. See
Kleindienst, 408 U.S. at 761.
17 Kleindienst, 408 U.S. at 762.
- Id. at 762-69.
111 Id. at 762.
"-I Id. at 766.
Id. at 769.
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justification against the First Amendment interests of
those who seek personal communication with the
applicant."1 2
2
Justice Douglas's dissent emphasized that national se-
curity was not at stake in this case1 23 and that First
Amendment considerations override the discretionary
power of the Attorney General, who should exercise that
discretion solely on matters "commonly within the com-
petence of the Department of State - national security,
importation of drugs, and the like."'' 24 Justices Marshall
and Brennan focused on the importance of the right to
receive information, and would have required a finding
that the restriction furthers a compelling governmental
interest, at least in those cases where the First Amend-
ment rights of American citizens are involved.' 25 The ar-
guments for the use of the compelling interest test in
alien exclusion resemble strongly the arguments found in
the state restrictions on nonresident right to travel
cases.
12 6
The Supreme Court made its most recent pronounce-
ment on the right to travel doctrine in the 1981 case of
Haig v. Agee.' 27 Philip Agee, an American citizen residing
in West Germany and a former Central Intelligence
Agency employee, was informed in 1979 that his passport
had been revoked. This action was taken pursuant to a
State Department regulation allowing revocation if "[the
applicant's] activities abroad are causing or are likely to
cause serious damage to the national security or the for-
eign policy of the United States."'128
Agee had announced and implemented a campaign to
expose employees of the CIA and to thwart CIA efforts
worldwide. Revocation was influenced by the recent tak-
122 id. at 770.
- Id. at 772 (Douglas J., dissenting).
[',4 Id. at 774.
5 Id. at 777 (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan, J., dissenting).
126 See discussion supra part II.A.
12 453 U.S. 280 (1981).
12m 22 C.F.R. § 51.70(b)(4) (1991).
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ing of the American Embassy in Iran in 1979 and reports
that Agee was in contact and cooperating with the Iranian
captors in analyzing CIA documents. 29  Agee was noti-
fied of his right to an administrative hearing on the revo-
cation, 13 but Agee instead filed suit against the Secretary
of State. He sought declaratory and injunctive relief,
claiming the regulation was invalid for lack of congres-
sional authorization, and that the regulation was unconsti-
tutional as a violation of his Fifth Amendment right to
travel interest, his First Amendment right to criticize gov-
ernment policies, and his Fifth Amendment right to pro-
cedural due process in failing to accord him a hearing
prior to revocation. The district court held that Congress
had not granted the Secretary of State such authority,1 3 '
relying on the discussions concerning the delegated au-
thority of the Secretary under the Passport Act of 1926 in
Kent v. Dulles 132 and Zemel v. Rusk. 33 The circuit court
affirmed. '34
The Supreme Court reversed,' 3 5 and thereby seemed to
abandon its former reasoning in Kent and Zemel. The
Court examined the history of the Passport Act of 1926136
and found implicit congressional authorization of the past
exercise of discretion by the Secretary in revoking pass-
ports on national security or foreign policy grounds.' 37
The Court in reaching this holding stated that "the Secre-
tary has the power to deny a passport for reasons not
specified in the statutes."' 38 The Court based this state-
ment on the Kent and Zemel decisions, finding implied con-
1', Agee, 453 U.S. at 286 n.8.
I.-- See 22 C.F.R. §§ 51.80-.89 (1991).
'3, Agee v. Muskie, 483 F. Supp. 729, 732, aff d, 629 F.2d 80 (D.C. Cir. 1980),
rev'd, sub nom., Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981).
1.-2 357 U.S. at 124-30.
381 U.S. at 7-12.
Agee v. Muskie, 629 F.2d 80, 84 (D.C. Cir. 1980), rev'd sub noma, Haig v. Agee,
453 U.S. 280 (1981).
Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 310 (1981).
22 U.S.C. § 21 la (1988).
1:17 Agee, 453 U.S. at 306.
11 Id. at 290.
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gressional authorization for refusal to issue passports for
applicants who violated the law or for considerations of
national security."3 9 The Court also found implicit au-
thorization from the 1978 enactment of a statute making
it unlawful in peacetime or time of war to enter or exit the
United States without a passport.' 40 The Court stated
that its holding was not contrary to Kent as executive pol-
icy was consistent on denial or revocation of passports on
grounds of national security or foreign policy.' 4 ' The
Court required "a substantial likelihood of 'serious dam-
age' to national security or foreign policy as a result of the
passport holder's activities in foreign countries [to allow
the government to] take action to ensure that the holder
may not exploit the sponsorship of his travels by the
United States." 142
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, dissented
on the ground that the majority's holding was contrary to
the test articulated in Kent and Zemel.' 43 Justice Brennan
stated that the proper analysis first required an examina-
tion of the Passport Act of 1926 for express authorization
for the grounds given for the denial or revocation, and,
upon failing to find express authority, an examination of
prior administration practice "which it could fairly be ar-
gued were adopted by Congress."' 144 Contrary to the ma-
jority's holding, Justice Brennan stated that Kent and Zemel
did not stand for implicit congressional authorization due
to "longstanding Executive policy or construction."'' 45
Instead, congressional silence would only imply authori-
zation where there had been a "consistent and substantial
''- Id. at 290-91.
140 Id. at 293 (relying on 8 U.S.C. § 1185(b)(1988)). The Court also noted the
1978 amendment of the Passport Act of 1926 to prohibit area restrictions except
in times of "war, armed hostilities, or imminent danger to travelers." Agee, 453
U.S. at 300.
141 Agee, 453 U.S. at 303.
'2 Id. at 309.
"41 Id. at 312 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
44 Id. at 314.
14 5d. (emphasis omitted).
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pattern of actual passport denials or revocations."' 46
The extension of the executive's power to regulate the
issuance and revocation of passports in Agee represents a
significant limitation on the constitutional right to
travel. 147 In response to ajudicial trend toward according
greater deference to executive and legislative pronounce-
ments on foreign policy, 1 48 the Court waived the constitu-
tional considerations inherent in the right to travel as
"subordinate to national security and foreign policy con-
siderations.' 1 49 The reasoning behind the Court's deci-
sion may have been swayed by the nature of Agee's
activities, and in a different set of circumstances the Court
may return to the line of reasoning behind the Kent and
Zemel decisions.
III. RESTRICTIONS ON TRAVEL BY AIRLINES
The availability of access to air travel is almost essential
to functioning in today's society. The inability to travel by
air may not totally preclude travel, as the inability to re-
ceive a valid passport precludes travel outside the United
States, but it can seriously hamper or endanger an indi-
vidual who is stranded in a country far from home. Air-
lines, as members of one of the most heavily regulated
industries in this country, are statutorily limited when re-
stricting access to their services on a discriminatory ba-
sis. 150 Airlines may, however, deny the right to board to
certain people without incurring liability for discrimina-
tion. 15 ' The determination of whether an individual can
1411 Id. at 315.
-7 See The Supreme Court, 1980 Term - Leading Cases, 95 HARV. L. REV. 91, 209
(1981).
141 See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 655-658 (1981); Rostker v.
Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 59-62 (1981).
Agee, 453 U.S. at 307.
49 U.S.C. § 1374(c) (1988) (prohibiting discrimination against physically
disabled passengers); Id. § 1374(a) (requiring provision of "safe and adequate ser-
vice"); Id. § 1511 (allowing denial of transportation upon airline's determination
of a potential safety threat posed by passenger).
151 See, e.g., West v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 923 F.2d 657, 661 (9th Cir. 1990)
(airline required only to pay the cost of alternate transportation to compensate a
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remain on a flight is usually left solely to the airlines, with
only generalized regulatory guidelines to limit their dis-
cretion. The restrictions on travel imposed by the airline
may not be as far reaching as governmental restriction,
yet the effect on individuals without a viable travel alter-
native may be the same. Therefore, the existing standards
should be carefully reviewed and weighed against the im-
portance of access to air travel in effectuating the consti-
tutional right to travel.
This discussion focuses on three areas in which access
to air travel is limited by air carriers: restrictions imposed
due to terrorist threats, denial of access due to the physi-
cal characteristics of the potential passenger, and denial
of boarding due to overbooking. The manner in which
the restriction to air travel is imposed differs in each area,
but the effect on the traveler is ultimately the same.
A. RESTRICTIONS ON TRAVEL DUE TO TERRORISM
In 1931, an aircraft in Peru was hijacked, marking the
first recorded incidence of terrorism involving an air-
plane. 52 In 1949, a Philippine aircraft was the subject of
a bombing, killing all passengers aboard.' 53 Since then,
terrorist incidents involving airlines have become ever
more frequent. 54 Indeed, during the Gulf War airlines
were one of Saddam Hussein's chief targets for terrorist
threats.' 5   The threat of terrorism causes many Ameri-
passenger bumped from an overbooked flight); Telluric v. Trans World Airlines,
Inc., 881 F.2d 566, 569 (8th Cir. 1989) (implying that airline would not be liable
for denial of access to an unaccompanied disabled person who could not comply
with reasonable request of airline personnel); Williams v. Trans World Airlines,
509 F.2d 942, 948 (2d Cir. 1975) (no liability for denial of access to known
criminal).
152 Humphrey G. Dawson, Civil Aviation, Hyacking and International Terrorism: An
Historical and Legal Review, 15 INT'L Bus. L. 57, 58 (1987).
153 Id.
151 REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON AVIATION SECURITY AND TER-
RORISM, at 115 (May 15, 1990) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT]. See
also Larry Habegger andJames O'Reilly, Expanded Need for Caution, CHI. TRIB., Feb.
3, 1991, at C3 (detailing countries in which terrorist threats or attacks have re-
cently occurred).
155 J.A. Donoghue, Back To Business: After the Persian Gulf War Airlines See Passenger
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cans to hesitate to travel abroad and to view with suspi-
cion the ability of the airlines and governments to protect
them from harm.156
As incidents of terrorist activity against airlines and air-
ports become increasingly common, 1 7 the cost of security
measures and liability insurance weaken the already un-
stable aviation industry. 158  National and international
measures to improve security against terrorist threats are
aimed at increasing passenger safety, yet these measures
also contribute to the limitations on access to air travel in
three ways. First, as the cost of security rises, the price
per ticket also increases as airlines seek to maintain profit-
ability and offset higher operating costs. 159 Second, air-
lines may close routes into countries at war or in which
the danger of terrorism and cost of insurance outweigh
the profit margin. 160 Routes may also be involuntarily
shut down by governmentally imposed economic sanc-
tions or area travel restrictions. 16 1 Third, since responsi-
bility for the actual implementation of security measures
Traffic Rebounding, 28 AIR TRANS. WORLD 2 (1991); Habegger and O'Reilly, supra
note 154, at C18; Bonus/War Roils Travels, GANNETT NEWS SERVICE, Mar. 28, 1991,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, GNS file; Allen F. Richardson, 6th Airline Cuts
Flights to Israel, USA TODAY, Jan. 8, 1991, at 4A; Desiree French, With War Over,
Recession Easing, Travelers Return, GANNETT NEWS SERVICE, Mar. 28, 1991, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, GNS File; Allen F. Richardson, Airlines Wary ofIraqi Ter-
rorism Threats, GANNETT NEWS SERVICE, Jan. 6, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Li-
brary, GNS File.
I.- Doug Carroll, War, Austerity Pinching Frequent-Flier Deals, USA TODAY, Jan. 29,
1991, at IB;J.A. Donoghue, supra note 155; Desiree French, Business, Leisure Trav-
elers Cut Trips for Terrorist Fears, GANNETr NEWS SERVICE, Jan. 16, 1991, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, GNS File.
's PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 154, at 115.
158 Nancy J. Strantz, Aviation Security and Pan Am Flight 103: What Have We
Learned?, 56J. AIR L. & COM. 413, 453 (1990).
', Id. at 459-61.
" Emma Tucker and Neil Buckley, The Gulf War: Airlines Cancel or Avoid Worst
Spots, FIN. TIMES,Jan. 29, 1991, at 4 (airlines suspend flights into the Middle East
during Gulf War); Richardson, Airlines Wary, supra note 155, at 4A (airline insur-
ance rates increased by ten to twenty times in less than one week for some destina-
tions); Allen F. Richardson, 6th Airline Cuts, supra note 155, at 4A (airlines suspend
flights into Middle East as insurance premiums soar); Lucia Mouat, 1'ar Fears Fade,
Air Fares Drop, and People Revive Travel Plans, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 19,
1991, at 1 (U.S. airlines lost $3 billion in last quarter of 1990 due to Gulf War).
161 See infra notes 271-80 and accompanying text.
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rests primarily on the airlines, 62 and liability for their fail-
ure is charged to them, 63 the ability of the airlines to uni-
laterally determine whether a passenger poses a security
risk gives rise to potential abuse of this discretion.
1. Statutory Background
a. The Warsaw Convention
The Warsaw Convention, 64 ratified by the United
States in 1934, provided in its original form that an air
carrier was liable for bodily injury or death if the injury
occurred during embarking, disembarking, or while
aboard the aircraft, but placed a ceiling on the amount
recoverable. 165 The agreement was initially designed to
aid the economic growth of the newly emerging airline in-
dustry. 166 A safe harbor was therefore provided if the air
carrier could prove that all reasonably necessary measures
had been taken to prevent the injury or that the damage
was unavoidable.' 67  The United States denounced the
Warsaw Convention in 1965 due to the government's dis-
satisfaction with the limited liability provisions.' 6 The
1971 Montreal Agreement, 69 in response to the concerns
of the United States, increased the limits on passenger re-
1'2 See infra notes 257-62 and accompanying text. See also Strantz, supra note 158,
at 466-67 (discussing possible alternatives to funding of security by airlines).
I'l See Strantz, supra note 158, at 453-63; Norman P. Seagrave, An Airline's Ap-
praisal of Tort Liability Arising From Aircraft Hyacking, 1 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM.
339, 340-43 (1973).
" Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating To International
Transportation By Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876, 137 L.N.T.S.
11, reprinted in note following 49 U.S.C. § 1502 (1988) [hereinafter Warsaw
Convention].
'; Id. art. 17.
' Strantz, supra note 158, at 419.
" Warsaw Convention, supra note 164, art. 20.
' See Lee S. Kreindler, The Denunciation of the Warsaw Convention, 31 J. AIR L. &
CoM. 291, 303 (1965). Article 22 of the Warsaw Convention placed a limit of
125,000 francs (approximately $8,300 U.S.) per passenger for death or injury on
an international flight. Warsaw Convention, supra note 164, art. 22.
"ill Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Act Against the Safety of Civil
Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, T.I.A.S. No. 7570, 10 I.L.M. 1151 (1988) [hereinafter
Montreal Agreement].
1992] 369
370 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [58
covery for bodily injury or death. 70 It also removed the
safe harbor provision of unavoidability or reasonable nec-
essary safety measures taken.' 7' Also in 1971, the Warsaw
Convention was amended by the Guatemala Protocol, 172
making the air carrier's liability absolute and removing
the rebuttable presumption of the carrier's fault. 7  The
only remaining safe harbor for the airline was the situa-
tion of a death or injury resulting from the passenger's ill
health. 174 Thus, air carriers were made liable for injuries
and deaths resulting from acts of terrorism.
Three factors have been identified by courts in deter-
mining an air carrier's liability under the Warsaw Conven-
tion: location of the accident, the activity engaged in by
the passenger immediately prior to the incident, and the
amount of control exercised by the air carrier over the
passenger at the time of the incident. 75 Applying the lia-
bility provisions of the Guatemala Protocol, courts have
allowed recovery even where the carrier lacked control
due to acts of terrorism. 76
Under article 25 of the Convention, a carrier cannot
limit its liability if the airline or its agents engage in willful
misconduct. 77 The Convention is otherwise silent on the
171 Id. art. 20.
171 Id. Article 20 of the Montreal Agreement states:
(1) The limit of liability for each passenger for death, wounding, or
other bodily injury shall be the sum of $75,000 inclusive of legal fees
and costs, except that, in case of a claim brought in a state where
provision is made for separate award of legal fees and costs, the limit
shall be the sum of U.S. $58,000 exclusive of legal fees and costs.
(2) The Carrier shall not, with respect to any claim arising out of
the death, wounding, or other bodily injury of a passenger, avail it-
self of any defense under Article 20(1) of said Convention or said
Convention as amended by said Protocol.Id.
172 Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Re-
lating to International Carriage by Air, as amended by the Protocol Done at The
Hague on 28 Sept. 1955, done Mar. 8, 1971, I.C.A.O. Doc. No. 8932, 64 DEP'T.
ST. BULL., at 555, 556 (1971) [hereinafter Guatemala Protocol].
17:1 Id. art. IV.
174 Id.
175 Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 550 F.2d 152, 155 (3d Cir. 1977).
1'1 Id. at 156; Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31, 33 (2d Cir. 1975).
'77 Warsaw Convention, supra note 164, art. 25.
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question of punitive damages, but the Supreme Court has
held that punitive damages are also available if the plain-
tiff can establish willful misconduct on the part of the air-
line. ' 78 Additionally, recovery for mental anguish without
bodily injury, even though not provided for under the
Warsaw Convention, 179 was allowed in Hussari v. Swiss Air
Transport Co. 180 An air carrier's liability for terrorist acts
has been greatly expanded in a time of increased danger
of terrorism.
Victims of terrorism are often unable to locate the true
perpetrator. As a substitute they have sued not only the
air carrier under the Warsaw Convention, but also private
security firms engaged by airports and embassies, mag-
netic detection companies, airplane manufacturers,18' and
airline corporate officers. 82 Insurance against terrorism
is also available as another means to compensate victims
of terrorist acts. 83  Suits against the United States gov-
ernment for failure to warn passengers of a bomb threat,
however, are probably barred by the Federal Torts Claims
Act (FTCA). 8 4 Under the FTCA, plaintiffs would have to
show that the negligence occurred in the United States, 85
118 Chan v. Korean Airlines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122, 128-29 (1989) (interpreting arti-
cle 25 of the Warsaw Convention literally); cf. Floyd v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 872
F.2d 1462, 1465 (11 th Cir. 1989), rev'd, Ill S. Ct. 1489 (1991) (finding that article
25 merely waived the usual limitations on the recovery of compensatory damages
alone); Harpalani v. Air India, Inc., 634 F. Supp. 797, 800 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (puni-
tive damages not available under the Warsaw Convention).
179 Seagrave, supra note 163, at 342. See also Burnett v. Trans World Airlines,
Inc., 368 F. Supp. 1152, 1153, 1158 (D.N.M. 1973)(no recovery for mental
anguish without bodily injury).
,so 388 F. Supp. 1238, 1248 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
I'l See Dawson, supra note 152, at 64.
'2 See Reed v. Wiser, 414 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
18, Kimberly A. Trotter, Note, Compensating Victims of Terrorism: The Current Frame-
work in the United States, 22 TEx. INT'L L.J. 383, 399 (1987) (private insurance for
terrorism covers extortion, kidnapping, and ransom demands, and is offered by
seven insurance companies).
14 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1988).
I" STUART M. SPEISER & CHARLES F. KRAUSE, AVIATION TORT LAw, vol. 2, § 15:9
(1978). One method of showing that the negligence occurred in the United States
would be to sue the FAA in Washington for either failing to warn passengers itself
or failing to require the airline to warn passengers. Id. To be successful in such a
claim, however, there would need to be a showing that the failure to warn was not
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an almost insurmountable barrier since virtually all terror-
ist acts have taken place outside the United States.
b. Federal Aviation Administration
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has the pri-
mary governmental responsibility for airline security.' 86
The FAA has increased the level of security required by
both air carriers and airports in response to terrorist
threats. The Air Transportation Security Act t 87 attempts
to provide a balance between protecting passengers
against criminal and terrorist violence and the public's in-
terest in safe air transportation.' 88 Under this Act, the
FAA Administrator prescribes rules to safeguard persons
and property aboard aircraft.'8 9 Regulations prohibiting
disclosure of information regarding terrorist threats may
be promulgated by the Administrator upon his determina-
tion that the information would be detrimental to the
safety of the airline passenger. 90
The Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990'' was
passed in response to the demands of the families of vic-
tims of a terrorist bomb on Pan American Flight 103,
which exploded over Lockerbie, Scotland in 1988.19' The
level of security is adjusted by United States airlines and
airports based on information received from the FAA and
local government security bulletins. 193 The bulletins are
based upon an assessment of the threat which is made by
the FAA, CIA, FBI, and Defense Intelligence Agency.' 94
If information regarding a terrorist threat is received or
a part of the FAA's discretionary function, which normally includes the adoption
or rejection of policies, rules, and regulations. Id.
1- 49 U.S.C.A. app. § 1357 (Supp. 1992).
',7 Id. § 1357.
I8 Id.
I ld. § 1357(a)(1).
Id. § 1357(d)(2).
Pub. L. No. 101-604 (codified at 49 U.S.C.A. § 1301 (West Supp. 1990)).
112 Craig R. Whitney, Jetliner in Crash Blew Apart In Air, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23,
1988, at Al, col. 6.
"I Strantz, supra note 158, at 445-49.
IN Id.
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intercepted, and the threat is determined to be specific
and credible, 195 the government may conclude that pre-
vention of the incident is not possible and may cancel a
flight by a United States based carrier.1 96 A foreign air
carrier whose flight has been targeted will be advised to
cancel the flight.' 97 Failure to cancel the flight will result
in the issuance of State Department warnings to embas-
sies, the press, and the public. 98
A short time after the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103,
the FAA promulgated an emergency regulation requiring
enhanced scrutiny of passengers and baggage in airports
of Western Europe and the Middle East. 99 The regula-
tion also mandated that passengers be matched to their
luggage to guard against suitcases containing bombs be-
ing left at an airline or given to an innocent traveler to
transport as a gift for a stranger.20 0 As of January 1989,
installation of computer controlled access systems became
mandatory for all entrances to secure areas. 20  The FAA
also evaluated 65 of 136 security programs by comparing
them to the International Civil Aviation Organizations's
standards .22
The Department of Transportation (DOT) also in-
creased the required security measures after an internal
review of the airport and airline security systems.20 3 The
security bulletin process was revised to create two levels
of notice to air carriers: information circulars and security
'11. The FAA, assisted by intelligence agencies, makes this determination based
on information from the State Department. Aviation Security: Hearing Before A Sub-
committee of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 23, 49
(1989).
; Id. at 9 (statement of Secretary of Transportation Samuel K. Skinner).
Aviation Security: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Aviation of the Committee on
Senate Commerce, Science & Transportation, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 44, 51-52 (1989)
(statement of Clayton E. McManaway, Jr.).
I Id. at 52.
''" PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 154, at 175.
20", Id.
201 Id.
212 Id. at 180-81.
2 3 Id. at 176.
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directives.204 Technological standards were increased for
x-ray and metal detection equipment, and two thermal ra-
diation analysis devices were installed in airports.2 °5 Ad-
ditional security specialists were approved for overseas,
and an Aviation Security Advisory Committee was estab-
lished.20 6 The DOT began discussions with foreign secur-
ity officials and increased its communication and
coordination with American intelligence agencies.20 7 A
review of air carrier compliance with the FAA's emer-
gency rule was also implemented by the DOT.20 8
c. The President's Commission on Aviation
Safety and Terrorism
On August 4, 1989, the President's Commission on Avi-
ation Security and Terrorism (the Commission) was estab-
lished. 20 9 The purpose of the Commission was "to review
and evaluate policy options in connection with aviation se-
curity. ' 210 The bipartisan Commission's mandate was to
"conduct a comprehensive study and appraisal of prac-
tices and policy options with respect to terrorist acts in-
volving aviation," including evaluating "the adequacy of
existing procedures for aviation security, compliance
therewith, and enforcement thereof. 21 1
The Commission's report, presented to the President
on May 15, 1990, criticized virtually every aspect of the
existing aviation security system.212 The report notes the
failure of the FAA to enforce its own regulations, and de-
scribes the FAA as a "reactive" agency. 2 3 The report de-
204 Id. at 178. Under the revised notification system security directives require
immediate action by affected airlines. Information directives are merely informa-
tive and action is discretionary to the airlines. Id.




2(01 Exec. Order No. 12,686, 54 Fed. Reg. 32,629 (1989).
210 Id.
' Id. § 2(b).
212 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 154, at 63.
2., Id. at 63.
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tails sixty-four recommendations for reform, 21 4 two-thirds
of which have already been implemented. 2 t5 The main
thrust of the report is to increase governmental involve-
ment and streamline or replace existing security proce-
dures, thereby reducing some of the economic burden on
air carriers and decreasing the airlines' autonomy in se-
curity matters.216
The report changed the technological focus from that
of recent years. Formerly, thermal neutron analysis (TNA)
devices had been considered the most advanced available
technology, 21 7 and were the emphasis of much of the pro-
posed legislation dealing with aviation security.2 t8  The
TNA devices were originally thought to be ninety-five per-
cent successful in detecting bombs, 2 ' 9 but the Commis-
sion reported that the reliability of the TNA devices was
significantly lower in detecting small amounts of plastic
explosives.220 Other drawbacks to the TNA devices are
their cost ($750,000 to $1 million each), their weight (ap-
proximately ten tons, requiring structural reinforcement
of buildings in which they are installed), and their speed
(approximately six seconds per bag is required for effec-
tive screening). 22' The devices also cannot be used to
screen passengers or carry-on baggage, since they utilize
nuclear radiation to locate traces of the organic chemicals
used in plastic explosives.22 2 Despite these drawbacks, the
DOT already required United States airlines to assume
the cost of installation for the TNA devices. 2 3 The Com-
mission noted that alternative technology is currently
214 Id.
2- Betty Mills, Federal Officials Report Progress On Commission's Recommendations,
AIR SAFETY WK.,July 30, 1990, at 3.
2-11 See Strantz, supra note 158, at 464.
217 135 CONG. REC. H5883 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1990)(statements by Rep.
McCurdy).
211 See Strantz, supra note 158, at 435.
2111 Charles A. Riley, The Hard Road to Airport Safety, FORTUNE, May 22, 1989, at
84; Strantz, supra note 158, at 435.
221, President's Commission Report, supra note 154, at 64.
221 Id.
"2- Id. at 63.
22:1 Transportation-Aviation Security, CONG. Q WKLY. REP., Dec. 2, 1989, at 3308.
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available, and called for increased research and develop-
ment efforts and allocation of funds by the FAA.224
Another key area focused on by the Commission was
the lack of coordination and communication between the
State Department, the FAA, and the American intelli-
gence agencies.22 5 In order to increase accountability and
reduce duplication of effort, the Commission recom-
mended appointing an Assistant Secretary for Aviation
Security and Intelligence within the DOT and requiring
that agents from the CIA or a similar agency serve at the
Office of the Secretary in the DOT. 2 6 These changes
would centralize security efforts and provide more coher-
ent and uniform information to the airlines.227 On an in-
ternational level, the report suggested that the State
Department, with input from the DOT, should take the
lead in negotiating security issues, rather than leaving this
role with the air carriers. 228 To accomplish this change,
the report suggested appointing a Coordinator for In-
ternational Aviation Security, with the rank of am-
bassador.22 9
To rectify existing security problems, the Commission
recommends better training for airport security employ-
ees and government security inspectors, as well as creat-
ing specific security plans for each airport.230 According
to the Commission, current FAA security regulations lack
guidelines in meeting performance standards. 23 1 An on-
site security manager at high risk airports would provide
needed communication and coordination between the air-
124 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 154, at 64, 66-67. Among the
technologies noted by the Commission were vapor-detection devices, new electro-
magnetic technology, and atmospheric-pressure chambers for air cargo. Id. at 64.
2 Id. at 57.
226 136 CONG. REC. S9202 (daily ed. June 28, 1990) (statements of Sen.
Lautenberg); see also PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 154.
221 136 CONG. REC. S9202 (daily ed. June 28, 1990)(statements of Sen.
Lautenberg).
228 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 154, at 81-82.
22 Id. at 82.
2.311 Id. at 56, 58, 60.
231 Id. at 56.
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port operator and air carriers, as well as ensuring consis-
tency in the enforcement of security regulations.232 An
on-site security manager would also be familiar with the
airport security plan and its effectiveness. This would aid
the FAA in its development, assessment, and enforcement
of its security regulations.233
To deal with the lack of a uniform international security
system, the report proposes using bilateral and multilat-
eral agreements with foreign governments, thereby fur-
ther removing the air carriers from the decision-making
process in security matters. 23 14 Replacing the air carriers
in negotiation with foreign governments would help re-
solve the difficulties in establishing uniformity in spite of
the variance in technological capabilities, economic re-
sources, and outlooks on aviation security among foreign
nations.23 5
The report also focused on the FAA's procedure for is-
suing security bulletins. The FAA recently implemented a
new policy distinguishing between security directives and
information circulars, which was noted as a significant im-
provement by the Commission.236 Under the new policy,
immediate action is mandatory for affected airlines when a
security directive is issued for serious or imminent
threats.23 7 Written procedures for dealing with the threat
as well as acknowledgement of receipt and reports of ac-
tion taken on the directive are required from the air-
lines. 238 However, the effectiveness of this new policy
remains to be seen, and the airlines' complaint that the
information they receive is "too vague and general to be
of much value to them" must be taken into account in the
implementation of the regulations.239
2.12 Id. at 57, 60.
211 Id.
2,4 Id. at 28, 39, 40.
235 Id. at 27, 28.
2_16 Id. at 76-79.
237 Id.
2.3M Id.
2" Id. at 79.
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Public notification of threats may finally become a real-
ity, depending on the action taken on the Commission's
recommendations. The FAA has consistently refused to
give notice to the public of threats received, preferring to
advise cancellation of flights to the air carriers on the
grounds of the impracticality or impossibility of effectively
warning the public. 240 The Commission would give pri-
mary responsibility of notification to the government to
provide uniformity in the determinations. 24' The Depart-
ment ofJustice and the FBI, in conjunction with the DOT
and FAA, would make the assessment domestically, while
the State Department would assume this role internation-
ally.242 Unclassified information would still be available
for dissemination by the airlines to their passengers.243
The Commission noted that in recent years terrorism
has become state-sponsored and that terrorist acts are
acts of aggression toward the nations of the victims. 2 44 It
should be noted, however, that air carriers continue to
bear the brunt of the costs for security and the compensa-
tion for victims despite this acknowledgement by the
Commission that the airlines are not the target of the ter-
rorists. 245 Therefore, the continued lack of major govern-
mental funding to implement the proposed improvements
in security will continue to have an adverse effect on the
ability or willingness of airlines to risk flights which may
be endangered by terrorist acts.
In light of this, the Commission's recommendation for
the establishment of a permanent fund to provide both
tax relief and monetary benefits for United States citizens
who are victims of terrorism may ameliorate the situa-
tion.246 Also suggested in the report was the ratification
241 Id. at 86-88, 178, 179.




245 135 CONG. REC. H5768 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1989) (statement of Rep. Ober-
star); PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 154, at 115.
2111 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 154, at 105-07.
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of certain amendments to the Warsaw Convention which
would increase the amount recoverable by the victims and
their families.247 The Montreal Protocols, signed in 1975,
would increase personal liability limits to 100,000 special
drawing rights248 and establish a cargo liability limit equal
to approximately $21 per kilogram.249 The Commission
also recommends the adoption of a supplemental com-
pensation plan which would provide full recovery of all
economic and non-economic damages for United States
citizens and permanent residents on any international
flight.25 0 The fate of these recommendations has not yet
been determined, as the House and Senate have yet to
reach consensus on the compensation issue.2 5'
The FAA and State Department reported implementa-
tion of two-thirds of the report's sixty-four recommenda-
tions within two months of its release.252 The legislative
response has been equally swift, with both House and
Senate bills being introduced within only months of the
presentation of the report.25 The FAA, however, remains
opposed to legislation regarding security matters.25 4 Ar-
247 Id. at 124.
24, The special drawing rights are an international monetary unit keyed to the
International Monetary Fund. They replace the current fluctuating liability stan-
dard which is based on the price of gold. Michael Baumeister, Expanding Con-
cepts of Liability Under the Warsaw Convention, 6 n.34, presented at and reprinted in
materials of the 24th Annual SMU Air Law Symposium (Mar. 2, 1990); see also, P.
Jacobs & B.F. Kiker, Accident Compensation for Airline Passengers: An Economic Analysis
of Liability Rules Under the Warsaw Convention, 51 J. AIR L. & COM. 589 (1986);
Carolyn Aldred, Pan Am Crash Imperils OK for New Liability Cap, Bus. INS. Mar. 27,
1989, at 1.
2,, Robert A. Brazere, Annotation, Liability Under Warsaw Convention (49 Stat.
3000 et seq.) of International Air Carrier for Death or Injury of Passenger Sustained in Air-
port Terminal During Course of Terrorist Attack, 36 A.L.R. FED. 490, 495 (1978).
2-1, PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 154, at 124.
251 See Aviation Security Improvement Act, H.R. 5732, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.,
136 CONG. REC. H8469 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1990)(recommending adoption of Mon-
treal Protocols and supplemental compensation plan); S. 2822, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess., 136 CONG. REC. S9201 (daily ed. June 28, 1990) (companion bill to H.R.
5732) (making no mention of either the Montreal Protocols or the supplemental
compensation plan).
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guing that legislation will reduce its flexibility in handling
threats to security, the FAA prefers to- set its own stan-
dards internally pursuant to the broad policies delineated
by the DOT.255 The necessity for a balance between
accountability and flexibility in handling aviation security
will prove a difficult challenge in crafting a system to
provide effective and efficient handling of terrorists
threats .256
2. The Effects of Terrorism on Air Travel
In contrast to governmental provision of security for
European air carriers, United States carriers must cover
all domestic security costs, including the training and
equipment for personnel at airport security checkpoints,
air cargo and baggage inspection, airport access systems,
and secured area protection at airports.2 57 The ever in-
creasing cost of funding for improved security measures
continues to frustrate the attempted reforms and to drain
the profit margins of the already reeling aviation indus-
try.258 Due to the seemingly unlimited amount of funding
available to the terrorists, one commentator has stated
that "it seems virtually certain that the funding and tech-
nological advancement of terrorists could surpass that of
the FAA. ' ' 259 The provision of a government subsidy to
the airlines could lessen the impact on the airlines and im-
prove the security measures available. For example,
Israel partially subsidizes the security costs of El Al Israel
Airlines, Ltd. which has a reputation for the tightest se-
curity in the world.26 ° Prior to each flight, El Al carefully
questions all passengers and matches them with their lug-
255 Strantz, supra note 158, at 483. Preference for its own standards over legis-
lation characterizes the FAA's position generally, including matters not related to
aviation security. Id.
251! See id. at 438-39.
.7 135 CONG. REC. H5768 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1989) (statement of Rep.
Oberstar).
2- See Strantz, supra note 158, at 453 (discussing the funding problems inherent
in current and proposed security legislation).
'-m Id. at 437.
-69 Id. at 438.
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gage.26' The price tag for these measures is stiff. The es-
timated costs for protecting El Al's twenty-one aircraft are
estimated at $30 million annually.2 62
Before and during the Gulf War, virtually all major air
carriers canceled flights to Saudi Arabia, Israel, Jordan,
Kuwait and Iraq.263 Many of the United States based air-
lines cited increased insurance premiums and increased
threats of terrorism as the major reasons for the suspen-
sion of service to the Middle East.264 At the height of the
war the insurance premium to fly into Tel Aviv increased
from $6,000 to $125,000 per flight, and rose to $250,000
if the plane remained on the ground for more than five
hours.265 Many corporations enforced travel policies
prohibiting or limiting international air travel by their em-
ployees.266 The airline industry canceled approximately
15,400 scheduled flights in January, 1991, and it was esti-
mated that January losses by the industry were $1 bil-
lion.2 67  The combination of increased fuel prices and
decreased travel caused serious damage to many airlines
and was a major factor in the liquidation of Eastern Air-
lines. 268  The Department of Transportation declined,
with one short-lived exception, to provide insurance to air
carriers as it did not find continued flights into the region
to be sufficiently in the national interest. 269
The voluntary cancellation of routes into the Middle
261 Id. at 438-39.
'262 Id. at 439.
263 Carroll, supra note 156, at I B; Crisis Leads Airlines to Cut Flights to Israel, NEws-
DAY, Jan. 4, 1991, at 13; Denise Gellene, Flights Grounded As Mideast Tensions Mount,
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 15, 1991, at D2.
26 French, supra note 156; Gellene, supra note 263, at D2; Richardson, Airlines
Wary, supra note 155.
2-'. Gellene, supra note 263, at D2. See also Northwest to Hike Fares by $15, L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 5, 1991, at P3 (Northwest Airlines imposes surcharge on domestic
fares to counter increased insurance costs resulting from Persian Gulf War);
266 Carroll, supra note 156, at 18; French, supra note 156.
267 Donoghue, supra note 167, at 2.
2611 Effect of Persian Gulf War on Economy Assessed By Speaker at UCLA Conference,
DAILY LA. REP., Mar. 14, 1991, at Current Dev. Section.
'll, Gellene, supra note 263, at D2 (Tower Air was the only American air carrier
to receive insurance from the United States government).
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East echoes former cancellations by airlines during war or
internal strife in those countries they service.270 United
States economic sanctions against countries have the ef-
fect of involuntary cancellation of routes.271 Under the
Trading with the Enemy Act of 1988272 (TWEA), the Pres-
ident has authority to impose comprehensive embargoes
on foreign countries in time of war as one means of deal-
273 Te Iing with national emergencies. The International
Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977271 (IEEPA),
gave the President the same power to impose embargoes
in response to peacetime emergencies.275 The Treasury
Department issues regulations under TWEA and IEEPA
implementing the embargoes.2 76 The regulations have
the effect of preventing flights into the sanctioned coun-
try, as they generally prohibit payment for goods and
services while in the country, and may expressly prohibit
airlines from conducting transactions for servicing and
airport fees.277 Total embargoes are currently in effect
against Cuba, North Korea, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, 27 8
270 See, e.g., Gulf Air to Resume Flights to Beirut After 16-Year Suspension, REUTER
NEWS SERVICE, June 30, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wire Services File
(Gulf Air resumes flights to Beirut after 16 years to end of Civil War). Taiwan Flag
Carrier to Resume Flights to Vietnam, REUTER NEWS SERVICE, Aug. 18, 1991, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wire Services File (China Airlines resumes service to
Vietnam after 16 year suspension).
271 See, e.g., Flights Are Set From Vietnam, N.Y. TIMEs,June 21, 1991, at D16 (lim-
ited resumption of flights to Vietnam may presage opening of regular routes if
embargo is lifted); Northwest to Start First U.S. Flights to Vietnam, UPI,July 20, 1991,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File (Northwest Airlines to fly to Vietnam
on humanitarian mission, U.S. embargo on Vietnam and Cambodia remain in ef-
fect and prevent regular commercial service).
272 50 U.S.C. §§ 1-100 (1988).
273 Id. § 5(b).
274 Title II, Pub. L. No. 95-223, 91 Stat. 1625 (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-06
(1988)).
275 Id. § 101(b).
276 See, e.g., Cuban Assents Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 5154 (1991) and
Treasury Department Regulation 201(b) prohibiting transactions involving prop-
erty in which the Cuban government or Cuban citizens have "any interest of any
nature whatsoever, direct or indirect." 31 C.F.R. § 515.201(b) (1991).
277 Id. See also Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 242 (1984) (holding that the practi-
cal effect of the regulation is the prevention of travel to Cuba by most United
States citizens).
278 Regan, 468 U.S. at 253 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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and limited embargoes are in effect against Czechoslova-
kia, Lithuania, and Estonia.2 v9 The change in political
structures in Eastern Bloc countries and loosening travel
restrictions worldwide 280 may lead the United States to lift
certain embargoes or change its own policies on limiting
travel.
B. RESTRICTIONS ON TRAVEL DUE TO PHYSICAL
CHARACTERISTICS
The physical condition of a passenger may affect his
ability to deplane in an emergency,28' the safety and com-
fort of the other passengers, 282 and the amount of care
necessary for airline personnel to provide. 8 Airlines
must take all these factors, and others, into consideration
when determining whether to allow a potential passenger
to board. The guidelines set out for the airlines to use in
making these decisions provide little protection for the
right to travel.
As a common carrier, an airline has a duty to provide
air transportation to all persons who tender the appropri-
ate fare.284 This duty, however, is rarely discussed in
these terms any longer. 285 The confined space aboard an
2711 Id. at 242.
2"0 Burke, supra note 1, (Soviet Union eased travel restrictions for its nationals,
policy to take effect, Jan. 1, 1993 and will continue to exclude eligibility for those
facing criminal or civil claims, those subject to the draft, and those privy to state
secrets); Taiwan's Air Traffic Surging, supra note 1, at 47; (Taiwan eases travel re-
strictions); Schmemann, supra note 1, at A12 (liberal travel restrictions after the
opening of the Berlin Wall); Earnshaw, supra note 1 (China eases travel restric-
tions generally, still imposes harsher restrictions on foreign journalists); Graham,
supra note 1, at Al (Poland eases travel restrictions, but retains some prohibitions
on travel for certain classes of citizens); Betts, supra note 1, at 17 (French travel
restrictions imposed as part of austerity program relaxed by government).
28, Telluric v. Transworld Airlines, Inc., 881 F.2d 566, 569 (8th Cir. 1989).
22 Manfredonia v. American Airlines, 416 N.Y.S.2d 286, 292 (N.Y. App. Div.
1979).
21, Adamsons v. American Airlines, Inc., 457 N.Y.S.2d 771, 774-75 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1982).
28,4 Austin v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 246 So.2d 894, 896 (La. Ct. App. 1971).
2 Indeed, very few discussions of airline liability even acknowledge that air-
lines are common carriers. See Id. at 896 (arguing that airlines should no longer
be required to comply with traditional notions of common carrier duty).
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airplane and the fact that the aircraft is in the air seem to
be the distinguishing factors for the difference in latitude
granted to airlines and other common carriers in their de-
cisions as to who will be allowed passage. 286
Potential passengers may be turned away or removed
from a flight if, in the opinion of airline personnel, they
might pose some danger to the safety of the flight.2 8 7 No
investigation of the truth or degree of danger posed is
required of the airline, 288 and the airline's decision is vir-
tually unchallengeable.289 Some limitations on this unilat-
eral decision-making power have been created; the
prohibition against racial discrimination is one exam-
ple.2 9 0 The airlines are also closely watched for discrimi-
nation against disabled persons. 291  Regardless, the
airlines retain broad discretionary power to restrict access
to their services with little governmental intercession.
1. Racial Discrimination
Racial discrimination in preventing a passenger from
boarding has long been held to be impermissible.29 2 The
first case brought under section 404(b) of the Federal Avi-
ation Act 293 (the Act) was Fitzgerald v. Pan American World
286 Id.
2.7 49 U.S.C. § 1511 (1988); Adamsons, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 774-75.
21 Williams 509 F.2d at 948.
2119 Adamsons, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 774.
2 See, e.g., Abou-Jaoude v. British Airways, 281 Cal. Rptr. 150, 152 (1991);
Fitzgerald v. Pan American World Airways, 229 F.2d 499, 502 (2d Cir. 1956).
2' See discussion infra part III.B.2.
292 See Fitzgerald, 229 F.2d at 502.
293 49 U.S.C. § 1374(b) (1978) (repealed in 1983 by 49 U.S.C.A. app. § 1551
(West Supp. 1992)). Section 1374 provides that all air carriers must:
provide safe and adequate service, equipment, and facilities . . .
[and] establish, observe, and enforce just and reasonable . . . rules,
regulations, and practices relating to [air travel]... No air carrier or
foreign air carrier shall make, give, or cause any undue or unreason-
able preference or advantage to any particular person ... or subject
any particular person ... to any unjust discrimination or any undue
or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect
whatsoever.
49 U.S.C.A. app. §§ 1374(a)(1) & (b) (West Supp. 1992). Under § 1551 of the
Federal Aviation Act, § 1374(b) ceased to have effect as to interstate and overseas
air transportation on January 1, 1985, but continues to apply to foreign air trans-
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Airways.29" In this case the plaintiff, Ella Fitzgerald, a
world renowned jazz vocalist, was denied boarding on a
flight from Honolulu to Sydney, Australia. She had flown
first-class from San Francisco to Honolulu, where the
plane made a brief layover. Pan Am agents then refused
to allow Fitzgerald to reboard the plane. The court held
that a private right of action for discriminatory boarding
practices existed under section 404(b). 295
In Colorado Anti-Discrimination Commission v. Continental
Air Lines Inc. ,296 the Supreme Court held that section
404(b) did not expressly or implicitly preempt state law
claims based on race discrimination, but only those claims
based on rate discrimination.297 In reaching this conclu-
sion the Court examined the legislative intent behind the
Act's anti-discrimination provisions and determined that,
in the absence of regulations by CAB, the state could en-
act its own anti-discrimination statutes and enforce them
against airlines.298 The case involved racially discrimina-
tory hiring practices by the airline, but the Court stated
that 404(b) "prohibit[s] racial discrimination against pas-
sengers and other customers .... 299
In Abou-Jaoude v. British Airways,30 0 the court held that
section 1305(a)(1) 30 1 of the Act preempts claims brought
portation. 49 U.S.C.A. app. § 1551 (West Supp. 1992). Therefore, claims regard-
ing racial discrimination would not have to be brought under § 1511 of the Act or
under state law. See, e.g., Abou-Jaoude, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 152.
2- 229 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1956).
" Id. at 502.
372 U.S. 714 (1963).
7 Id. at 723-24. For a discussion of liability under § 1374 to non-passengers,
see Mason v. Belieu, 543 F.2d 215, 218-19 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (no private right of
action of person waiting for passenger who was refused permission to board); see
also William Becker Travel Bureau, Inc. v. Sabena Belgian World Airways, 13 Av.
Cas. (CCH) 17,770 (S.D.N.Y. May 1, 1975) (travel agents protected from unfair
application of filed tariffs); United States v. City of Montgomery, 201 F. Supp. 590
(M.D. Ala. 1962) (non-passengers may not be subjected to racially discriminatory
restaurants and restrooms in airports).
2:,1 Colorado, 372 U.S. at 724.
' Id. at 723.
281 Cal. Rptr. at 150.
.'' 49 U.S.C.A. app. § 1305(a)(1)(West Supp. 1992). Section 1305(a)(1) pro-
vides that: "no State ... shall enact or enforce any law, rule, regulation, standard,
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under state statutes requiring airlines to treat all passen-
gers with civility but does not preempt claims brought
under a state nondiscrimination statute. 2 The claim of
racial discrimination was brought by passengers who were
Lebanese and who alleged they were treated rudely by a
British Airways ticket agent while attempting to clarify
baggage handling procedures during a flight change. The
court found that the state law discrimination claim was
not preempted because the statute related only to the
provision of services in general, rather than solely to the
services of air carriers. 03 The plaintiff was therefore al-
lowed to recover for racial discrimination under the Cali-
fornia anti-discrimination statute.3 0 4
2. Physically Disabled Passengers
Originally, claims of discrimination against persons by
the airline industry were founded on section 404 of the
Federal Aviation Act.3 5 Under section 404(a) all air carri-
ers are required to "provide safe and adequate service,
equipment, and facilities. 3 0 6 Section 404(b), repealed in
1983, prohibited air carriers from "subject[ing] any par-
ticular person ... to any unjust discrimination or any un-
due or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any
respect whatsoever. 3 0 7 The CAB used section 404(a) as
a basis for prohibiting commercial airlines from discrimi-
or other provision having the force and effect of law relating to rates, routes or
services of any air carrier having authority under the subchapter IV of this chapter
to provide air transportation." Id.
.02 Abou-Jaoude, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 152.
"03 Id. at 153. The underlying statute, the Unruh Civil Rights Act, provides that:
"All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no matter
what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, or blindness or
other physical disability are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advan-
tages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind
whatsoever." CAL. CIv. CODE § 51 (West Supp. 1992).
.' Abou-Jaoude, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 153.
49 U.S.C. § 1374 (1976) (§ 1374(b) was repealed in 1983 by 49 U.S.C.
§ 1551 (1988)).
I-0 Id. § 1374(a).
307 Id. § 1374(b).
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nating against disabled individuals °8 Courts used sec-
tion 404(b) as a basis for implying a private right of action
by disabled persons against airlines.3 0 9  However, the
courts concluded that Congress did not impliedly create a
private right of action under section 404(a).31
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,3 " which
prohibits discrimination against disabled persons by "any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assist-
ance," 312 was used by the CAB to regulate only those air-
lines receiving federal subsidies under section 406(b) or
section 419 of the Federal Aviation Act. 31 3 The CAB reg-
ulations were much more extensive than the section
404(a) anti-discrimination provisions,31 4 yet the CAB's in-
terpretation of section 504 as only applying to air carriers
receiving federal funds was challenged in United States De-
partment of Transportation v. Paralyzed Veterans of America.31 5
The plaintiffs argued that all airlines indirectly receive
federal financial assistance, through the air traffic control
system and airport development programs, and that the
CAB's scope of authority under section 504 therefore ap-
plied. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, hold-
ing that section 504 does not apply to commercial
airlines.3 6 This decision left disabled individuals without
a private remedy for discrimination by airlines, for their
only basis for a claim was section 404(a)'s "safe and ade-
30, 14 C.F.R. § 382, Subpart A (1992).
3- Hingson v. Pacific Southwest Airlines, 743 F.2d 1408, 1411-12 (9th Cir.
1984); Nader v. Allegheny Airlines Inc., 512 F.2d 527, 537 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'd
on other grounds, 426 U.S. 290 (1976).
11o Anderson v. USAir, Inc., 818 F.2d 49, 54 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Hingson, 743 F.2d
at 1414; Diefenthal v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 681 F.2d 1039, 1045 (5th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1107 (1983).
,,, 29 U.S.C. § 701 (1988).
3112 Id. § 794(a).
.11. 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1376(b), 1389 (1988). Under section 406(b), airlines
transporting mail to small communities received subsidies, and under section 419,
airlines providing passenger service to small communities were federally subsi-
dized. Id.
.14 14 C.F.R. § 382, subparts B and C (1992).
"l 477 U.S. 597, 604-06 (1986).
I ld. at 606.
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quate service" requirement 3 1 7
In 1985 Congress passed the Air Carrier Access Act
(ACAA) which prohibits discrimination by an air carrier
against "any otherwise qualified handicapped individual,
by reason of such handicap, in the provision of air trans-
portation. ' 3 8  The legislative history indicates that the
ACAA was enacted in response to the Supreme Court's
decision in Paralyzed Veterans.3 '9 However, the ACAA does
not expressly provide a private cause of action.
In 1989, the Eighth Circuit confronted the issue of the
existence of a private right of action under the ACAA in
Tallarico v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. 320 In this case, Polly
Tellarico, a 14 year old with cerebral palsy, was not al-
lowed to board unaccompanied due to her disability.
Polly had previously communicated with her travel agent
and the airline about her disability and had filed a "special
service request" with the airline. When Polly arrived at
the airport accompanied only by a driver, TWA refused to
allow her to board. The Eighth Circuit held that there
was an implied private right of action under the ACAA for
discrimination on the basis of a handicap.3 2 ' The court
implied a private cause of action under both section
404(b) of the Federal Aviation Act,322 and section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act.323 The court relied on Depart-
ment of Transportation regulations which define a "quali-
"7 Shinault v. American Airlines, Inc., 936 F.2d 796, 802 (5th Cir. 1991).
" 49 U.S.C. app. § 1374(c) (1988).
"9 See 132 CONG. REC. S21, 770 (daily ed. Aug. 15, 1986) (statement of Sen.
Dole); S. Rep. No. 400, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2328, 2329; 132 CONG. REC. H23,658 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1986) (statement of
Rep. Sundquist); 132 CONG. REC. H24,670-71 (daily Sept. 18, 1986) (statements
of Reps. Mineta, Hammerschmidt, Ackerman, Edgar and Snyder).
320 881 F.2d 566 (8th Cir. 1989).
321 Id. at 570.
. 49 U.S.C. app. § 1374(b) (1988). The statute provided that -[n]o air carrier
or foreign air carrier shall make, give, or cause any undue or unreasonable prefer-
ence or advantage to any particular person ... or subject any particular person...
to any unjust discrimination or any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvan-
tage in any respect whatsoever." Id. See Hingson, 743 F.2d at 1411 (private cause
of action implied); Smith v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc. 567 F.2d 290, 293-94 (5th
Cir. 1978) (allowing recovery under Federal Aviation Act).
-2-1 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1988).
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fled handicapped person" as one: (a) who tenders
payment for air transportation; (b) whose carriage will not
violate Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regula-
tions; and (c) who is willing and able to comply with rea-
sonable safety requests of airline personnel or, if unable
to comply, is accompanied by a responsible adult passen-
ger who can ensure compliance with such request.
324
In evaluating a disabled person's ability to comply with
reasonable requests, the court looked at the abilities of
the individual rather than allowing the airline to accord
blanket discrimination against all persons with a certain
type of disability. 25 TWA's policy had formerly been that
in case of any doubt as to the passenger's capability of ex-
peditiously moving to an exit without assistance, the pas-
senger will be required to demonstrate privately the
capability of moving from one chair to another. If he/she
can do so he/she will be deemed capable of expeditiously
moving to an exit without assistance.3 26
TWA had not attempted to comply with its own guide-
lines. The Tallarico court also held that damages for emo-
tional distress are recoverable under the ACAA,327 but did
not reach the issue of whether punitive damages are
available.328
The issue of an implied private right of action under the
ACAA was again discussed in Shinault v. American Airlines,
Inc.329 This case involved a quadriplegic passenger who
missed his connecting flight allegedly due to American
Airline's discrimination against him because of his disabil-
ity. Shinault had flown from Washington, D.C., to Nash-
ville, Tennessee, and was then transfered to another
.2 Tallarico, 881 F.2d at 569; 14 C.F.R. § 382.5(d)(3)(1992).
42 Tallarico, 881 F.2d at 569.
121; David B.B. Helfrey and Russell W. Piraino, Equal Access to Air Transportation
- The Only Way to Fly, 8 LAW & INEQUALITY 469, 482 n.84 (1990) (quoting the
Trans World Passenger and Services Manual).
-127 Tallarico, 881 F.2d at 570.
32-' Punitive damages were available under the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C.
§ 1374(b) (1982) (repealed 1983 by 49 U.S.C. § 1551 (1988)). Wills v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 360, 367 (S.D. Cal. 1961).
329 936 F.2d. 796 (5th Cir. 1991).
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American Airlines flight to Jackson, Mississippi. The
flight from Washington was delayed due to mechanical
problems and bad weather and landed in Nashville after
the scheduled departure time for the Jackson flight. Bad
weather, however, had also delayed planes departing from
Nashville, and all other passengers making the same con-
nection were able to board the Jackson flight. American
Airlines refused to allow Shinault to board the Jackson
flight because he arrived after thejetbridge had been pul-
led back from the plane since American allowed all other
passengers on the Washington Flight to deplane before
Shinault. Shinault claimed the airline intentionally dis-
criminated against him due to the extra time required to
board a passenger in a wheelchair.
The court reaffirmed Tallarico's conclusion that a private
right of action exists under the ACAA, 330 but differed in
its approach to the damages issue. The Tallarico court had
compared the federal anti-discrimination statutes al-
lowing and disallowing emotional damages, and con-
cluded that the ACAA is more closely analogous to those
that allow emotional distress damages. 33 1 The court in
Shinault preferred to look to principles of statutory con-
struction in holding that plaintiffs could recover "all nec-
essary and appropriate remedies" under the ACAA.3 2
The court found that compensatory and emotional dis-
tress damages are available under the ACAA, and implied
that punitive damages might be available if the type of
wanton or malicious conduct required to recover punitive
damages was alleged and proven. 33
The existence of an implied private right of action
under the ACAA will force airlines into compliance with
nondiscriminatory policies and procedures promulgated
by the Department of Transportation. 3 4 The clarity of
."1 Id. at 804.
3' Tallarico, 881 F.2d at 570.
312 Shinault, 936 F.2d at 803-04.
.1:1 Id. at 804.
3-11 14 C.F.R. § 382 (1992); 49 C.F.R. § 27 (1991).
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the ACAA guidelines for denial of boarding will aid in en-
suring that the right to travel has real meaning for dis-
abled persons.
3. Criminality and Unruly Behavior
Outside the areas of discriminatory denial of boarding
based on race or handicap, airlines have wide discretion in
refusing to allow passengers to board. 3 5 Prior to 1985,
claims of discriminatory boarding practices could be
brought under section 404(b) of the Act." 6 State law dis-
crimination claims were held to be preempted by section
404(b) pursuant to section 1305(a)(1) 337 and therefore all
wrongful exclusion claims had to be brought under sec-
tion 404(b).3 38 Section 404(b) expired January 1, 1985,
under section 1551(a)(4)(C) 3 39 of the Act, and "it may be
inferred that Congress intended the states to begin to en-
force protections such as those previously afforded by sec-
tion [404(b)]. ' 340 The removal of the protection against
discrimination provided in section 404(b) allows state law
discrimination claims to be brought, but removes one lim-
itation on an airline's discretion in refusing permission to
board under section 151 134' of the Act. 342
Section 1511 of the Act allows an air carrier to deter-
3. See, e.g., Cordero v. CIA Mexicana de Aviation, 681 F.2d 669, 671 (9th Cir.
1982); Williams, 509 F.2d at 948.
336 49 U.S.C. app. § 1374(b) (1982) (repealed by 49 U.S.C. § 1551 (1988)).
337 49 U.S.C § 1305(a)(1) (1988). Section 1305(a)(1) provides:
No state or political subdivision thereof and no interstate agency or
other political agency of two or more states shall enact or enforce
any law, rule, regulation, standard, or other provision having the
force and effect of law relating to rate, routes, or services of any air
carrier having authority under subchapter IV of this chapter to pro-
vide air transportation.
Id. § 1305(a)(1).
338 Mason, 543 F.2d at 219.
13' 49 U.S.C. app. § 1551(a)(4)(C) (1988).
.111 Salley v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 723 F. Supp. 1164, 1166 (E.D. La.
1989).
-4, 49 U.S.C. app. § 1511 (1988).
14" See O'Carroll v. American Airlines, Inc., 863 F.2d 11, 15 (5th Cir. 1989) (air-
line's discrimination under § 1511 as § 1374 provides a cause of action for dis-
criminatory or unreasonable exclusion).
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mine unilaterally that transportation of a passenger or
property "would or might be inimical to safety of
flight. 343 In Williams v. Trans World Airlines,344 the court
set out a test for whether or not the airline properly exer-
cised its power under section 1511 to refuse a passenger
to board. This test stated that the proper exercise of dis-
cretion "rests upon the facts and circumstances of the
case as known to the airline at the time it formed its opin-
ion and made its decision and whether or not the opinion
and decisions were rational and reasonable and not capri-
cious or arbitrary in light of those facts and circum-
stances. 345 The court also held that the airline was not
required to conduct a thorough inquiry into the facts in
forming its opinion.346 The court noted that under state
law a commercial air carrier is a common carrier and thus
owes its passengers the duty of utmost care for their
4 49 U.S.C. app. § 1511 (1988). The full text reads:
(a) The Administrator shall, by regulation, require any air carrier,
intrastate air carrier, or foreign air carrier to refuse to transport
(1) any person who does not consent to a search of his person, as
prescribed in section 1356(a) of this title, to determine whether he is
unlawfully carrying a dangerous weapon, explosive, or other de-
structive substance, or
(2) any property of any person who does not consent to search or
inspection of such property to determine whether it unlawfully con-
tains a dangerous weapon, explosive, or other destructive substance.
Subject to reasonable rules and regulations prescribed by the Ad-
ministrator, any such carrier may also refuse transportation of a pas-
senger or property when, in the opinion of the carrier, such
transportation would or might be inimical to safety of flight.
(b) Any agreement for the carriage of persons or property in air
transportation or intrastate air transportation by an air carrier, intra-
state air carrier, or foreign air carrier for compensation or hire shall
be deemed to include an agreement that such carriage shall be re-
fused when consent to search such persons or inspect such property
for the purposes enumerated in subsection(a) of this section is not
given.
Id.
Where the airline's refusal is not based on a decision regarding the safety of the
flight, § 1511 does not apply, and state law claims of discrimination are not sub-
ject to the analysis of proper exercise of discretion. Salley, 723 F. Supp. at 1166.
.11 509 F.2d 942 (2d Cir. 1975).
.4 Id. at 948.
346 Id.
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safety. 47 The passenger in this case, Williams, was de-
nied boarding due to communications between the FBI
and the airline relating to an outstanding warrant for Wil-
liams arrest on kidnapping charges and his alleged
"armed and dangerous" status, as well as the possibility of
a demonstration on his arrival and the airline's fears of
hijacking.3 48 The court found these concerns, even
though not fully substantiated by the airline's investiga-
tion, were not arbitrary or motivated by racial or political
prejudice, and the airline's refusal to allow Williams to
board was reasonable and fully authorized by section
1511 under the circumstances.34 °
The court in Cordero v. Mexicana de Aviacion 350 relied on
the Williams test in determining that an airline would be
liable for damages under section 1511 if the decision was
unreasonable or irrationally formed.51 Cordero, along
with many of his fellow passengers, was upset at an un-
scheduled stop made by the airline. A passenger sitting
near Cordero loudly voiced his displeasure upon the an-
nouncement of the lay-over, and Cordero circulated a pe-
tition in the terminal during the stop protesting the delay.
The airline refused to allow Cordero to reboard, claiming
he had insulted the crew and the pilot. Further, the air-
line refused to allow Cordero to explain that they were
mistaken as to the identity of the vocal passenger. The
court found that the airline had not formed its opinion
reasonably as to the danger posed to the safety of the
flight by Cordero, and it was therefore liable for compen-
satory damages. 52 Cordero's claim for punitive damages
was not allowed by the court, as such damages are avail-
able only for wanton, oppressive or malicious conduct. 53
-I Id. at 946 n.8.
"44 id. at 944.
-141 Id. at 948.
681 F.2d at 669.
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In Zervigon v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc. 354 eight passengers
were removed from an airplane due to the captain's belief
that the passengers posed a potential highjack threat.
The court upheld the airline's expulsion of the plaintiffs
since, based on the totality of circumstances known to the
captain at the time he made the decision, it was reason-
able and appropriate.3 55 The plaintiffs, a music group,
were returning to New York from a performance the night
before in Florida. Prior to boarding the plane in Tampa,
a passenger overheard one of the plaintiffs as saying in
Spanish "when we arrive in the capital and they ask us for
our experience on this flight. ' 356 After boarding and taxi-
ing to the runway, one of the band members assaulted a
stewardess by holding and twisting her hand. He was sub-
sequently removed from the plane by airport security
guards. Shortly thereafter, the passenger who had over-
heard the band's conversation in the terminal related the
context of the conversation to the passenger seated next
to him. Both subsequently informed the captain of the
conversation and their fear that the discussion meant the
plane was to be highjacked and that the word "capital"
referred to Havana, Cuba, presumably where the plane
would be forced to land. The captain then ordered the
plaintiffs removed from the plane without even question-
ing them.
The court relied on the Williams test3 57 in upholding the
captain's decision.358 Noting the captain's wide discre-
tionary power 359 and his responsibility to all passengers
and th crew,360 the court stated that if the captain had
ignore Ia the information he might have been subject to a
s 558 F. Supp. 1305 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
-155 Id. at 1307.
3-56 Id.
3.57 Williams, 509 F.2d at 948 (2d Cir. 1975).
--8 Zervigon, 558 F. Supp. at 1307.
4' Id. at 1306.
:,' Id. at 1307 n. 12. "The pilot in command of an aircraft is directly responsible
for, and is the final authority as to, the operation of that aircraft." 14 C.F.R.
§ 91.3(a) (1992).
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charge of dereliction of duty.36' Under section 1511 and
the tariff filed by Piedmont with the Civil Aeronautics
Board,362 the court found that the pilot was fully justified
in requiring the removal of the plaintiffs.3 63
Similarly, in Adamsons v. American Airlines, Inc. 36 4 the
court rejected a claim for wrongful exclusion under the
discretionary powers granted to the airline by section
1511. The plaintiff was refused passage on the basis of an
undiagnosed illness that had paralyzed her legs and obvi-
ously caused her extreme discomfort in sitting up. The
possibility of an infection to other passengers, as well as
the lack of knowledge as to what type and extent of care
might be required, led the airline to deny the plaintiff the
right to board. The appellate court upheld the airline's
decision based on section 1511 and the tariff the airline
had filed with the Civil Aeronautics Board in implementa-
tion of section 151 1.365 The court stated that the airline's
.11, Zervigon, 558 F. Supp. at 1307.
.111 Id. at 1305 n.4. The tariff provided that the airline could refuse transporta-
tion to anyone:
Whose conduct or condition is or has been known to be obnoxious,
offensive, intimidating, violent, or otherwise disorderly and there is
a possibly in the prudent judgment of a responsible carrier em-
ployee, that such passengers would cause disruption or serious im-
pairment to the physical comfort and safety of other passengers or
carriers' employees, interfere with a crew member in the perform-
ance of his duties aboard carrier's aircraft ... or otherwise jeopard-
ize safe and adequate flight operations.
Id.
", Id. at 1308.
.' 444 N.E.2d 21 (N.Y. 1982).
Id. The airline's tariff provides in pertinent part:
(A) Refusal, Cancellations or Removal. (1) carrier will refuse to
carry, cancel the reserved space of, or remove enroute any passenger
when: (a) such action is necessary for reasons of safety; (b) such ac-
tion is necessary to prevent violation of any applicable laws, regula-
tions, or orders of any state or country to be flown from, into or
over; (c) the conduct, age or mental or physical condition of the pas-
senger is such as to (i) require special assistance of carrier; or
(ii) cause discomfort or make himself objectionable to other passen-
gers; or (iii) involve any hazard or risk to himself or to other persons
or to property.
International Passenger Rules Tariff No. PR-2. See also Adamsons, 444 N.E.2d at 24
(tariff has the force of law).
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decision should not be second-guessed by the courts, and
that as long as the decision was made in good faith and for
a rational reason, it must be accepted. 36 6 "[T]he decision
to accept or refuse a passenger for air carriage lies exclu-
sively with the airline. '367 If the decision is made for le-
gitimate safety reasons, it may be based solely on the
passenger's behavior and appearance.3 68 According to
the court, a determination by the airline that the plaintiff
would need "extraordinary individual care," thereby in-
terfering with the duty owed by the airline to its other pas-
sengers, sufficed as a basis for excluding the plaintiff from
the flight.3 69
The standard for reviewing the airline's exercise of dis-
cretion is simply whether the decision was arbitrary, capri-
cious, or irrational.3 70 However, the court was careful to
emphasize that the airline's decision "must be premised
on a valid concern for the safety of the flight and the indi-
viduals on that flight. A carrier who uses the safety issue
as a sham in order to accomplish another purpose will not
be insulated from liability."3 7 1
The plaintiff's argument that the airline was negligent
in not investigating the nature and extent of plaintiff's ill-
ness prior to making its decision was also rejected by the
court.372 The lack of investigation did not persuade the
court that the airline's decision was arbitrary or negligent,
since requiring such investigation would contradict the
congressional purpose in vesting such discretion in the
airlines. 3
4. Intoxication
Airlines have great economic incentive to serve alcohol
.111 Adamsons, 444 N.E.2d at 24-25.
367 Id. at 24.
368 Id.
-I, Id.
.371 Id. at 24-25.




during flight. Since its inception in the 1950's, in-flight
service of liquor has been a means of promotion and
profit for the airlines.Y Counting the money from sales
of alcohol, however, may blind the airline to the potential
liability to which it is exposed by an intoxicated passenger
who injures other passengers, or even injures himself.
Consuming two to three drinks at an altitude of 10,000 to
12,000 feet is the physiological equivalent of consuming
four to five drinks,3 75 thereby giving rise to the potential
for inadvertent intoxication and liability for drunken
behavior.
An airline that does not expel an intoxicated passenger
may be liable to a third party injured by that passenger. 6
The FAA has forbidden service of alcohol to intoxicated
passengers.3 7 7 The court in Manfredonia v. American Air-
lines 378 held that violation of this regulation gives rise to a
private right of action for the injury. 79
The injured passenger in Manfredonia was hit by another
passenger who was served alcohol by the airline while visi-
bly intoxicated. The plaintiff's claim was based on two
theories: (1) that there was a breach of the airline's com-
mon law duty of care to safeguard her from violence by an
intoxicated passenger, and (2) that the "applicable" laws
prohibiting the sale of alcohol to intoxicated persons were
violated.38 0  The plaintiff originally identified the FAA
-174 Barbara Reukema, Drinking and Flying: Why the Two Do Not Mix Well on U.S.
Carriers, 9 ANNALS OF AIR & SPACE L. 133, 133 (1984); Catherine Stone Bowe,
"May I Offer You Something to Drink From the Beverage Cart? ": A Close Look at the Poten-
tial Liability for Airlines Serving Alcohol, 54 J. AIR L. & CoM. 1013, 1013 (1989) (li-
quor prices generally have risen 45% since 1977, but prices for in-flight drinks
have risen 100%).
.175 Bowe, supra note 374, at 1013; Ross ARMSTRONG MCFARLAND, HUMAN FAC-
TORS IN AIR TRANSPORTATION: OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH & SAFETY 298 (1953).
'71; See Manfredonia v. American Airlines, 416 N.Y.S.2d 286 (N.Y. App. Div.
1979).
377 14 C.F.R. § 121.575(b)(1) (1991) ("No certificate holder may serve any al-
coholic beverage to any person aboard any of its aircraft who . . .appears to be
intoxicated.").
-71 Manfredonia, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 286.
_179 Id. at 290.
-1- Id. at 287.
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regulations as the source of the "applicable" laws for the
second cause of action, but later changed the basis of the
claim to the New York dram shop act.3 8 ' At trial, the jury
found for the defendant on the common law negligence
claim, and for the plaintiff on the violation of the state
dram shop.382
The airline appealed the finding of breach of New
York's dram shop act, arguing that New York law could
not be given extraterritorial effect.383 The appellate court
agreed, finding that the state dram shop act provisions
could not apply to interstate flights since the alcoholic
beverage had not been served within the state,384 and the
Federal Aviation Act preempts state dram shop laws.3 85
Preemption was based on the federal government's exclu-
sive control over federal airways.386 Despite the constitu-
tional grant of absolute power to the states to regulate the
"time, places, and circumstances under which liquor may
be sold, ' 387 the court noted that this power did not ex-
tend outside the borders of the state or to areas under the
exclusive control of the federal government.3 88  There-
fore, the state dram shop laws could not extend to federal
airways.
Applying the test of Cort v. Ash 389 to determine whether
an implied right of action arises under the Act, the Manfre-
48, Id.
."18 Id. at 288.
.1"- Id. at 287.
.114 Id. at 290.
38. Id. at 288.
311 Id. at 290. "Federal airway" is defined under the Act as that part of the
navigable airspace so designated by the Secretary of Transportation. 49 U.S.C.
§ 1301 (21) (1988). The Secretary is authorized to institute those regulations nec-
essary to insure the safe operation of aircraft and efficient use of airspace. Id.
§ 1348(a). Subject to compliance with these regulations, all U.S. citizens have the
right of transit through this airspace. Id. § 1304.
"I' U.S. CoNsr. amend. XXI, § 2.
," Manfredonia, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 290.
: 422 U.S. 66 (1975). Under this test an implied right of action exists when:
(1) the regulation is intended to protect a particular class of persons, (2) there is
an intention to create or deny a private right, (3) the right would be consistent
with the goal of the statute, and (4) the cause of action is one traditionally left to
state law. Id. at 78.
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donia court looked at the savings clause in the Act, which
provides that "[n]othing contained in this chapter shall in
any way abridge or alter remedies now existing at com-
mon law or by statute, but the provisions of this chapter
are in addition to such remedies. 3 90 According to the
court, the state remedy is thereby preserved through an
implied federal right of action based on FAA regula-
tions.3 9 1 The airline was thus held liable for the passen-
ger's injuries and required to pay compensatory
damages .392
Five years later the same court decided O'Leary v. Ameri-
can Airlines. 93 In this case the injury complained of was
not sustained by a passenger who had been injured by an
intoxicated passenger, as was the case in Manfredonia, but
was an injury to the intoxicated passenger himself. The
passenger's spouse brought a personal injury and wrong-
ful death action against the airline, claiming that the death
resulted from in-flight injuries. The decedent had appar-
ently been intoxicated prior to boarding the plane, and
the airline continued to serve him alcohol. The decedent
choked to death on a piece of food during the flight. The
trial court dismissed the pleadings, finding that they were
insufficient to give rise to a duty or breach on the part of
the airline.3 94 The appellate court reversed, finding that
the airline, as a common carrier, owed a common law duty
to its passengers to exercise reasonable care for known or
reasonably anticipated risks. 9 5 This duty, according to
the court, rises to an even greater level "if a passenger
suffers from a disabili y such as intoxication. 3 96 The
court remanded the ca e, finding that the plaintiff had suf-
ficiently stated a caus: of action and was entitled to at-
49 U.S.C. app, § 1506 (1988).
"' Manfredonia, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 291.
- Id. at 292.
475 N.Y.S.2d 285 (N.Y. App, Div. 1984).
.4 Id. at 287.
Ir, d. at 288.
-6 Id.
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tempt to prove negligence on the part of the airline. 97
The dissent argued that the airline did not owe the de-
cedent any special duty to protect him from the dangers
resulting from voluntary intoxication.3 9 8 Reasoning that
by merely serving food and drink, the airline could not
have reasonably foreseen the decedant's choking to death,
the action did not rise to the level of negligence and the
airline was not liable for breach of its duty of care.399 The
dissent would have denied the negligence claim since the
consumption of the alcohol, rather than the serving of it,
was the proximate cause of the decedent's injuries.40 0
The court in O'Leary also examined whether an implied
private right of action existed under the Act for violation
of the regulation prohibiting sale of alcohol to an intoxi-
cated person. 40 The appellate court agreed with the trial
court, finding that the FAA regulation prohibiting the sale
of alcohol to intoxicated persons 40 2 was not intended to
"protect an individual passenger from choking to death as
a result of his own intoxication. 40 3 Since the purpose of
the Act was to ensure the safety of passengers who might
be injured by the intoxicated passenger,40 4 the decedent
was not a member of the class for which the statute was
enacted to protect. Therefore, there was no implied pri-
vate right of action on behalf of a passenger injured from
his own intoxication. 40 5 The court stated that if the pas-
senger's conduct did not impose a risk to the safety of the
flight or to the other passengers, the regulation did not
397 Id.
.9I Id. at 290 (Weinstein, J., dissenting).
.110, Id. The court also noted that service of food to an intoxicated person is
commonly perceived as a means of promoting sobriety, assuming that the airline
knew of the decedent's inebriated state. The court also questioned, without de-
ciding, whether the airline could legitimately refuse to serve food or drink to the
decedent upon his request since he was a first-class passenger who had paid for
such service in purchasing his ticket. Id.
4" Id. at 290.
401 Id. at 262.
4,,- 14 C.F.R. § 121.575 (1991).
40 O'Leary, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 288.
41 Id. at 287.
405 Id.
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protect a passenger from his own conduct.40 6
Despite the holding in O'Leary that there is no implied
private right of action under the Act for injury to the in-
toxicated person himself, the case is authority for the
proposition that an airline may owe a common law duty to
an intoxicated person to refrain from the further service
of alcohol. A breach of this duty could create a common
law cause of action against the airline based on negligent
service of alcohol. Whether this duty to refrain from serv-
ing alcohol will extend to foreseeable victims on the
ground remains to be seen.
C. RESTRICTIONS ON TRAVEL DUE TO OVERBOOKING
When an airline has overbooked a flight it often must
"bump" ticketed passengers. This practice has led to
claims based on discrimination under the Federal Avia-
tion Act, 40 7 and under the Warsaw Convention;408 as well
as claims based on breach of contract 40 9 and common law
misrepresentation.1 0 In 1976, the Supreme Court dis-
cussed the necessity and desirability of overbooking by
airlines in Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc.4 ' 1 Despite Justice
Powell's acknowledgement that "[s]uch overbooking is a
common industry practice, '41 2 he contended that "[t]he
chance that any particular passenger will be bumped is so
negligible that few prospective passengers aware of the
4- Id. at 287-88.
407 See, e.g., Wolgel v. Mexicana Airlines, 821 F.2d 442 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 927 (1987); Karp v. North Cent. Airlines, 583 F.2d 364 (7th Cir. 1978); Wills
v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 360 (S.D. Cal. 1961).
400 See, e.g., Sassouni v. Olympic Airways, 769 F. Supp. 537 (S.D.N.Y. 1991);
Harpalani v. Air India, 622 F. Supp. 69 (N.D. Il. 1985); Mahaney v. Air France,
474 F. Supp. 532 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
409 See, e.g., Harpalani v. Air India, Inc., 622 F. Supp. 69 (N.D. Ill. 1985); Goran-
son v. Trans World Airlines, 467 N.Y.S.2d 774 (White Plains City Ct. 1983).
411 See, e.g., Nader v. Allegheny, Inc., 426 U.S. 290 (1976); Hill v. United Air-
lines, 550 F. Supp. 1048 (D. Kan. 1982).
41 426 U.S. at 290.
412 Id. at 294. Justice Powell noted the airlines' "use of statistical studies of no-
show patterns on specific flights" in predicting the quantity of reservations neces-
sary to ensure each flight is full. Id.
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possibility would give it a second thought. '4 13 This con-
tention is in direct conflict with the findings of the court in
Wills v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. ,4 4 which was decided well
before the CAB regulations approved overselling and
bumping practices by the airlines.41 5 In Wills, the court
found that oversales on a single flight occurred in a signif-
icant number of cases, and this fact influenced the court in
its award of exemplary damages.41 6
The policy of the CAB (now the policy of the DOT) is to
allow overbooking, leaving it to the airlines to ensure that
bumping is held to a minimum.41 7 In the case of"deliber-
ate overbooking, '41 8 the airline must follow a defined pro-
cedure according to its own tariff to determine the relative
priority of remaining and bumped passengers. 41 9  The
airline must first seek volunteers who are willing to relin-
413 Id. This contention seemingly contradicts his following statement that "the
total number of confirmed ticket holders denied seats is quite substantial, num-
bering over 82,000 passengers in 1972 and about 76,000 in 1973." Id.
14 200 F. Supp. at 360.
415 14 C.F.R. §§ 250.1-.10 (1991). The CAB's authority to regulate commercial
aviation was transferred to the Department of Transportation (DOT) pursuant to
the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1704 (1978)
and the Civil Aeronautics Board Sunset Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-443, 98 Stat. 1703
(1984). CAB's basic policies regarding overselling and denied boarding remain in
effect.
4 1 Id. at 367-68. The court found bumping due to oversales for a six month
period in 1959 to be as follows:








4 17 14 C.F.R. § 150.2(a) (1991). This regulation provides that "[in event of an
oversold flight, every carrier shall ensure that the smallest practicable number of
persons holding confirmed reserved space on that flight are denied boarding in-
voluntarily." Id.
- Regulations define deliberate overbooking as "the practice of knowingly
confirming reserved space for a greater number of passengers that can be carried
in the specific call of service on the flight and date for which confirmation is
given." 14 C.F.R. § 250.1 (1991).
', 14 C.F.R. § 150.4 (1991).
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quish their reserved space4 20 in return for compensa-
tion. 421 The airline must also arrange for comparable
transportation for a passenger denied boarding.422 If the
flight is still overbooked after volunteers have been
sought, the airline may then deny boarding to passengers
in accordance with its own boarding priority rules.4 23
Compensation as liquidated damages for involuntary de-
nied boarding must be provided,424 but the maximum
compensation provided by the regulations is $400.425
Passengers do have an optional right to recover damages
in a court of law.426
Under section 404(b) of the Federal Aviation Act,427
which was repealed in 1983, a passenger who was bumped
had an implied private right of action for failure to follow
the airline's boarding priority rules.428 The federal cause
of action for bumping under the Act required a showing
that the airline unreasonably discriminated in selecting
which passengers would be allowed to board.429 Compen-
satory damages for bumping were available, 430 but puni-
tive damages have generally been held to be unavailable
under a section 404(b).431 Courts, in determining liability
under section 404(b) discrimination theory, placed the
burden of proof on the airline to establish that its own
priority system was followed once the plaintiff had proven
420 Id. § 250.2b(a), (b).
421 Id. § 250.4.
422 Id. § 250.5.
423 Id. § 250.2b(b).
424 Id. § 250.4(a), (b).
42, Id. § 250.5.
42, Id. § 250.9.
427 49 U.S.C. app. § 1374(b) (1982) (repealed 1983 by 49 U.S.C. § 1551
(1988)). Section 1374(a) continues to require air carriers to provide safe and ade-
quate service.
42, Karp, 583 F.2d at 367; Wolgel, 821 F.2d at 446.
42,, Goranson, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 778.
4.11 Smith, 567 F.2d at 292 (compensatory damages of $1,051.80 affirmed); Karp,
583 F.2d at 364 (affirming award of $3.00 actual damages); Wills, 200 F. Supp. at
367-68 (compensatory damages of $1.54 awarded).
41 Smith, 567 F.2d at 292 ($1,500 punitive damage award reversed); Nader, 512
F.2d at 549 (punitive damages of $25,000 reversed); Karp, 583 F.2d at 364 (re-
versing and denying award of $2,000 punitive damages).
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that the carrier failed to honor his priority.43 2
In the first bumping case arising under section 404(b),
Wills v. Trans World Airlines,433 a passenger was denied pas-
sage on a flight because of overbooking. In holding that a
federal cause of action existed on behalf of the passenger,
the court felt that any state remedy for breach of contract
would be inadequate. 3 4 This was due to the fact that
proving actual damage commensurate with the wrong
would be very difficult for the passenger limited to recov-
ery under a state law breach of contract claim, as well as
the lack of availability of exemplary damages in many
states.435
In Nader v, Allegheny Airlines,436 Ralph Nader attempted
to sue under both section 404(b) and the common law
misrepresentation theory to hold the airline liable. Nader
was bumped from an Allegheny flight and, as a result,
missed a scheduled fund-raising rally. His misrepresenta-
tion claim rested on the airline's deliberate failure to ap-
prise him of its overbooking practice. The appellate court
refused to consider the common law misrepresentation
argument on the grounds that the CAB's power under
section 411 of the Act 437 is to investigate and to determine
whether an air carrier "has been or is engaged in unfair or
deceptive practices or unfair methods of competition. '438
The Supreme Court reversed and upheld the independ-
ent validity of the common law remedy,4 9 basing its deci-
432 Nader, 512 F.2d at 538; Archibald v. Pan American World Airways, 460 F.2d
14, 19 (9th Cir. 1972). The Archibald court also stated that the practice of
overbooking does not per se give rise to an actionable § 1374 violation. Archibald,
460 F.2d at 18. However, several courts have found that a carrier's violation of its
priority rules gives rise to a § 1374 cause of action. Nader, 512 F.2d at 538; Morti-
mer v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 276, 281 (N.D. Ill. 1969); Wills, 200 F.
Supp. at 363.
.1 200 F. Supp. at 360.
434 Id. at 365.
4.1 Id.
4.- 426 U.S. at 290.
4-7 49 U.S.C. § 1381 (1982) (repealed in 1983 by 49 U.S.C. § 1551 (1988)).
41 Nader, 512 F.2d at 541; 49 U.S.C. § 1381 (1982) (repealed 1983 by 49 U.S.C.
§ 1551 (1988)).
439 Nader, 426 U.S. at 299-300.
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sion in part on the savings clause found in section 1106 of
the Act.440 On remand to the appellate court, Nader's
misrepresentation claim again failed. 44 1 During the inter-
val between the Supreme Court decision and the second
appellate decision, the CAB had amended its regulations
to require airlines to place notices in their ticket offices
and in each ticket regarding overbooking practices and
the possibility that a passenger with a confirmed reserva-
tion might be bumped.442 The appellate court therefore
concluded that Nader could not recover because he was
not misled and knew about the overbooking practice.443
In 1990, the Ninth Circuit Court decided West v. North-
west Airlines, Inc. 444 and confronted the issue of preemp-
tion of state common law claims by section 1305(a)(1) of
the Act.445 West, a confirmed passenger, was informed
upon his arrival at the airline that the plane was
overbooked and he would not be allowed to board.4 46
West brought suit against the airline for breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing under Montana
law and for unjust discrimination under section 404(b) of
the Act.447 The court, finding that no punitive damages
were available for being bumped, stated that "federal reg-
ulations contemplate overbooking as an acceptable prac-
tice so long as passengers receive compensation. "448 The
court found that West's state law claim was not pre-
empted by the Act, as section 1305(a)(1) 449 "preempts
440 49 U.S.C. § 1506 (1988).
44, Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, 626 F.2d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
442 Id. at 1036.
443 Id,
444 923 F.2d at 657.
144 49 U.S.C. app. § 1305(a)(1) (1988). See supra note 337 for text of section
1305(a)(1).
446 West, 923 F.2d at 658.
447 Id.; 49 U.S.C. § 1374(b) (1982) (repealed in 1983 by 49 U.S.C. § 1551
(1988)).
441 West, 923 F.2d at 661. Under the regulations a passenger who has been
bumped may choose between recovering liquidated damages or pursuing those
damages available under state law. 14 C.F.R. § 250.9(b) (1991).
44s, 49 U.S.C. § 1305(a)(1) (1988). See supra note 337 for text of section
1305(a)(1).
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state claims only when the underlying statute or regula-
tion itself relates to airline services, regardless of whether
the claim arises from a factual setting involving airline
services. Thus, state laws that merely have an effect on
airline services are not preempted." '4 50
A passenger bumped from an international flight will
often bring a claim against the airline under article 19 of
the Warsaw Convention.45" ' The Warsaw Convention ap-
plies "to all international transportation of persons, bag-
gage or goods performed by an aircraft for hire. '4 52
International transportation in this context includes
flights originating and terminating in the United States, if
there are intermediate stops made at locations in other
countries.45 3 Article 19 of the Warsaw Convention pro-
vides for liability on the part of an air carrier for "dam-
ages(s) occasioned by delay in the transportation by air of
passengers, baggage or goods. 454
Some dispute has arisen in the courts over whether the
Warsaw Convention provides the exclusive remedy for a
passenger's damages resulting from his or her being
bumped from an international flight.455 The dispute has
450 West, 923 F.2d at 660. The court also found no implied preemption, relying
on section 1506 of the Act, which states: "Nothing contained in this Act shall in
any way abridge or alter the remedies now existing at common law or by statute,
but the provisions of this Act are in addition to such remedies." 49 U.S.C. § 1506
(1988).
4-. Warsaw Convention, supra note 164, art. 19.
4 2 Id. at art. 1 (1).
45, Rabinowitz v. Scandinavian Airlines, 741 F. Supp. 441, 443 (S.D.N.Y. 1990);
Warsaw Convention, supra note 164, art. 1(2). Article 1(2) provides that interna-
tional transportation for purposes of the Warsaw Convention includes:
any transportation in which, according to the contract made by the
parties, the place of departure and the place of destination, whether
or not there be a break in the transportation or transshipment, are
situated either within the territories of two High Contracting Parties,
or within the territory of a single High Contracting Party, if there is
an agreed stopping place within a territory subject to the sover-
eignty, suzerainty, mandate or authority of another power, even
though that power is not a party to this convention ....
Warsaw Convention, supra note 164, art. 1(2).
15, Warsaw Convention, supra note 164, art. 19.
1- Compare Harpalani, 622 F. Supp. at 73 (finding federal and state claims pre-
empted by the Warsaw Convention) with Wolgel, 821 F.2d at 445 (holding claim
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arisen primarily as a result of conflicting interpretations of
the meaning of "damage(s) occasioned by delay" in arti-
cle 19456 and article 24's provision that the Convention
provides the exclusive remedy for damages in cases cov-
ered by article 19.457
In Wolgel v. Mexicana Airlines,458 the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals concluded that "the Warsaw Conven-
tion does not provide a cause of action for bumping. 459
The claim was based on Mexicana Airline's refusal to al-
low the Wolgels to board due to overbooking. The
Wolgels held confirmed reservations and complied with
Mexicana's pre-boarding procedures. Upon their submis-
sion of a claim for boarding compensation, as provided
for by CAB regulations,4 60 Mexicana refused to compen-
sate them. The Wolgels brought suit five years after their
injury, thus raising the question of whether the claim was
barred under the Warsaw Convention's two-year statute
of limitations. 46' The court reached the conclusion that
the Warsaw Convention did not apply to the Wolgels'
claim 462 and that Illinois' five-year statute of limitations
did apply.463 The fact that the complaint was based on
non-performance of the contract for passage, rather than
for incidental damages due to the delay, persuaded the
court.464 The court's reasoning was based on legislative
for damages for the bumping itself are outside the Warsaw Convention) and Sas-
souni, 769 F.Supp. at 539-40 (holding Warsaw Convention was plaintiff's exclu-
sive remedy for damages caused by delay itself).
156 Warsaw Convention, supra note 164, art. 19.
4.1 Id. art. 24.
451 821 F.2d at 442.
4-51 Id. at 445.
4- 15 C.F.R. § 250.3 (1991).
411 Warsaw Convention, supra note 164, art. 29(a).
462 Wolgel, 821 F.2d at 444.
46. Id. at 445. The five year statute of limitations arises in Illinois for, among
other things, "all civil actions not otherwise provided for... " ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
110, para. 13-205 (Smith-Hurd 1984). Illinois has a ten year statute of limitations
for contract claims, ILL. ANN STAT. ch. 110, para. 13-206 (Smith-Hurd 194), and a
two year statute of limitations for personal injury claims. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110,
para. 13-202. The lVolgel court apparently felt that bumping fell outside both the
areas of contract and personal injury claims. See lVolgel, 821 F.2d at 445.
464 Molgel, 821 F.2d at 444-45.
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history of the Convention indicating that total non-per-
formance of a contract was not intended to be the basis
for article 19 claims.465 Thus, claims based on the dis-
criminatory bumping itself and for emotional harm
caused by the bumping were not preempted by the War-
saw Convention.466 In cases in which the damages claim is
based on incidental costs incurred as a result of the delay,
however, the Warsaw Convention does provide the exclu-
sive remedy.4 67
IV. CONCLUSION
The duty of an airline as a common carrier to accept all
passengers who tender the proper fare 468 is clearly limited
by safety considerations. The nature of air travel and the
risks inherent in the operation of an airplane require the
airline to consider all the passengers' safety and well-be-
ing in accepting or rejecting persons as passengers.469
Yet, the importance of air travel in the modern world and
the regulations that pervade every aspect of the aviation
industry should require that the ability of an airline to uni-
laterally decline to carry a passenger be carefully scruti-
nized. The continued vitality of the constitutional right to
travel, and its importance to our concept of freedom, re-
quires that even as risks to air travel increase, guidelines
for exclusion from flights by the airlines should be crafted
with an eye toward providing the most liberal access to air
travel as can safely be granted.
The need for the security of all passengers and crew is
extremely important, yet without a balance between se-
curity for all passengers and the individual's right to
travel, the fear of some unsubstantiated danger may over-
whelm the freedom to travel by air. The heavy burdens
41 Id. at 444.
4W; Id. at 445; Maheney, 474 F. Supp. at 534.
467 Sassouni, 769 F. Supp. at 540; Maheney, 474 F. Supp. at 534. See also Wolgel,
821 F.2d at 444-45 (implicitly holding that article 19 does not cover claims in-
curred from the delay itself).
1- Austin v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 246 So.2d 894, 896 (La. Ct. App. 1971).
46 Id. at 896-97.
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already placed on the airlines to fund security measures
and compensate victims, in conjunction with the increas-
ing danger from terrorism and ever more complex regula-
tions, may lead airlines to abuse the discretion placed in
their hands by section 1511 of the Federal Aviation Act.
Enactment of clear and comprehensive guidelines to di-
rect the airlines in their decisions to permit or deny
boarding would aid in ensuring that the constitutional
right to travel continues to have vitality and meaning for
United States citizens.

